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How a domestic violence survivor responds to the abuse she is 
experiencing depends on many factors. Some critical considerations 
include her access to resources, desire to stay in her relationship, and 
assessment of her own safety. Criminal and civil court systems place 
enormous pressure on survivors to separate from their abusive partners. 
Not only are survivors with children pressured to leave, they are punished 
when they stay. That punishment can come in any combination of 
diminished custody rights, limited parental rights, and incarceration. Yet 
a survivor who flees with her children is not immune to these same 
consequences: if she leaves in a manner that is not state sanctioned, she 
may be punished criminally or civilly for kidnapping her children, 
regardless of the violence she was experiencing at home. 
Criminal parental kidnapping charges can cost a survivor her 
liberty, safety, and relationship with her children. While some state 
statutes attempt to address the potential for flight from domestic violence, 
many do not acknowledge the intersection between parental kidnapping 
and domestic violence at all and none provide sufficient safeguards for 
battered parents. Survivors are caught in a double bind in which the state 
can both pressure them to leave abusive relationships and also punish 
them for the manner in which they do so. A survivor who does not incur 
criminal parental kidnapping charges may still be negatively impacted by 
her decision to leave in both the child welfare system and domestic 
relations court. 
Large scale systemic change is necessary to truly enhance survivors’ 
independence. In addition to amending parental kidnapping laws to 
adequately anticipate and respond to safety seeking defendants, individual 
attorneys and the larger domestic violence movement must become more 
willing and better prepared to advocate for all survivors across and 
outside of the legal system. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Criminal laws punishing parents for kidnapping their own children are largely 
conceived as existing to prevent a disgruntled parent from acting out of spite to 
punish the children’s other parent.1 Frequent news stories and AMBER Alerts often 
describe parents on the run, refusing to obey custody orders issued against them.2 
But parental kidnapping laws, also known as custodial interference statutes, cast a 
wider net than these stories might imply. It is not just vindictive, scheming parents 
who risk arrest and conviction when they deny access to their children. Survivors of 
domestic violence can also find themselves enmeshed in criminal proceedings for 
fleeing with their children. Although parental kidnapping laws vary greatly among 
the fifty states and Washington, D.C.,3 none of them adequately anticipate domestic 
violence or provide the protections needed when survivors of domestic violence 
escape with their children. 
It is not surprising that parental kidnapping occurs in the context of abusive 
relationships: it is important to note, however, that departures with the children by 
either the abusive parent or the survivor may be considered parental kidnapping.4 
                                         
1 See, e.g., People v. Olsewski, 630 N.E.2d 131, 136 (Ill. App. 1994) (“The statute was 
primarily intended to prevent disgruntled parents who were unsuccessful in their attempts to 
obtain custody through legal channels from seeking self-help by spiriting the children away 
to another jurisdiction in violation of a custody order.”).  
2 See, e.g., Dallas Franklin, Authorities Locate Oklahoma Mother Who Allegedly 
Abducted 2 Boys, NBC KFOR.COM (Aug. 9, 2016, 9:22 AM), http://kfor.com/2016/08/09/ 
authorities-searching-for-oklahoma-boys-who-were-allegedly-abducted-by-non-custodial-
parent/ [https://perma.cc/WU3V-ESJM] (detailing the safe return of two children abducted 
by their noncustodial mother); Mother Who Allegedly Abducted Her 6-Week-Old Baby 
Extradited to Virginia Jail, ABC WJLA (Aug. 2, 2016), http://wjla.com/news/crime/mother-
who-abducted-her-6-week-old-baby-extradited-to-virginia-jail [https://perma.cc/B2C4-
76AK] (noting that Child and Family Services had an order to remove the child from her 
mother’s care when the child was discovered missing); Jesse Paul, Fort Collins Police Say 
Parental Kidnapping Prompted Amber Alert for 5-Year-Old Girl, THE DENVER POST (Aug. 
12, 2016, 5:21 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/08/12/amber-alert-five-year-old-girl-
fort-collins/ [https://perma.cc/NBL6-NYXA] (describing a mother evading a court order to 
relinquish custody); Nicole Perez, 3-Year-Old Girl Found Safe After Amber Alert, 
ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL (Aug. 2, 2016, 8:48 AM), https://www.abqjournal.com/819018/3-
year-old-abducted-from-santa-rosa.html [https://perma.cc/7SBG-9TBA] (reporting on the 
safe return of a child after being kidnapped by her mother in violation of a custody order). It 
is interesting to note the prevalence of news stories regarding children abducted by their 
mother.  
3 NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR THE DEFENSE OF BATTERED WOMEN, THE IMPACT 
OF PARENTAL KIDNAPPING LAWS AND PRACTICE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS 11–
13 (2005) [hereinafter NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE].  
4 Id. at 1.  
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The difference in motivation between a survivor seeking safety with her children5 
and an abusive partner asserting control and dominance is of critical importance, 
especially given that research has demonstrated a strong relationship between 
domestic violence and parental kidnapping.6 Yet in an extensive report on parental 
kidnapping, the National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women 
(“NCDBW”) posited that “[d]espite the dramatic difference between these two 
acts—one vindictive and the other protective—the criminal justice system rarely 
considers the contexts of abductions.”7 
There is also a gendered component to parental kidnapping prosecutions. 
Although most children abducted by a relative are abducted by their biological 
                                         
5 This Article intentionally presumes that the survivors being discussed herein are both 
women and mothers, though it does not also presume that the abusive partners are men. 
While men can be abused in relationships by both women and men, this Article is specifically 
exploring the intersection between motherhood and survivorship in the context of defending 
against parental kidnapping charges in criminal court. Moreover, women are more likely to 
be on the receiving end of the kind of extensive intimate terrorism, coercive control, and 
battering that might prompt the need to suddenly and secretly break off all ties with an 
abusive partner. See, e.g., LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED 
WOMEN: A SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND 
JUSTICE 8–12 (Am. Psychol. Ass’n 2008) (discussing domestic violence typologies and the 
increased likelihood of women to be the victims of intimate terrorism as opposed to the more 
equally distributed situational couple violence); LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED 
MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 38–40 (N.Y.U. Press 2012). 
6 See, e.g., JANET CHIANCONE ET AL., A.B.A. CTR. ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, ISSUES 
IN RESOLVING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION BY PARENTS 15 (1998) (finding 
that 60% of abducting parents had previously threatened the life of the nonabducting parent 
in the past); GEOFFREY L. GREIF & REBECCA L. HEGAR, WHEN PARENTS KIDNAP: THE 
FAMILIES BEHIND THE HEADLINES 36 (1993) (finding that domestic violence “was present in 
54% of the couples in [the] sample, with the abductor reportedly the only violent partner 
90% of the time”); JANET R. JOHNSTON ET AL., EARLY IDENTIFICATION OF RISK FACTORS 
FOR PARENTAL ABDUCTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN 5 (2001) (reporting “high incident 
rates of domestic violence” in families that experienced parental kidnapping); Janet R. 
Johnston & Samantha K. Hamilton, Parental Abduction, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE 523, 524 (Nicky Ali Jackson ed., 2007) (describing how “[d]omestic violence and 
substance abuse—more often perpetrated by the male partner—are alleged to have occurred 
in two-thirds to three-quarters of families where children are subsequently abducted by a 
parent. In the majority of these cases there is some evidence to back up these claims”); 
Monique C. Boudreaux et al., Child Abduction: An Overview of Current and Historical 
Perspectives, 5 CHILD MALTREATMENT 63, 66 (Feb. 2000) (noting the correlation between 
domestic violence and parental kidnapping); Leslie Ellen Shear & Julia C. Shear Kushner, 
Taking and Keeping the Children: Family Abduction Risk and Remedies in U.S. Family 
Courts, 10 J. CHILD CUSTODY 252, 272 (2013) (noting that “many families that experience 
abduction have experienced domestic violence”). 
7 NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 1.  
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father,8 mothers are more likely to be convicted and incarcerated for parental 
kidnapping than fathers.9 This is true even though multiple researchers have found 
that mothers abducting their children were likely seeking safety from abuse while 
fathers were committing the abduction as part of a larger pattern of exerting power 
and control over the mother.10 
The harm that stems from the failure to distinguish between abusers and safety 
seekers is exacerbated by the ways in which the state—through both civil and legal 
systems—pressures survivors in abusive relationships into separating from their 
partners.11 Not only do many judges insist that it is the survivor’s responsibility to 
leave a violent relationship,12 they also assume she is prepared to make and maintain 
that choice, and that doing so is in her and her children’s best interest.13 In fact, many 
survivors make decisions to stay or leave specifically in light of how each decision 
might impact their children’s safety.14 If, however, a survivor rationally decides not 
to leave her abusive partner in order to protect her children, she risks being punished 
for this decision by incarceration, termination of parental rights, or loss of custody. 
On the other hand, if she chooses to separate on her own accord or bows to systemic 
pressure to do so, her departure with the children—if it meets the statutory 
                                         
8 HEATHER HAMMER ET AL., CHILDREN ABDUCTED BY FAMILY MEMBERS: NATIONAL 
ESTIMATES AND CHARACTERISTICS, NAT’L INCIDENCE STUD. OF MISSING, ABDUCTED, 
RUNAWAY, AND THROWNAWAY CHILDREN 4 (2002) (stating that 53% of family abductions 
are committed by biological fathers and 25% by biological mothers). 
9 JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 8. 
10 Johnston & Hamilton, supra note 6, at 524 (noting that it is usually fathers who 
kidnap children as part of a campaign of domestic violence whereas it is usually mothers 
who flee to protect their children ); see also Janet R. Johnston & Linda K. Girdner, Early 
Identification of Parents at Risk for Custody Violations and Prevention of Child Abductions, 
36 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 392, 404 (1998) (describing the fathers’ acts of 
kidnapping as a tactic of domestic violence against the other parent). 
11 Rona Kaufman Kitchen, Constrained Choice: Mothers, the State, and Domestic 
Violence, 24 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 375, 383–84 (2015) (“[S]tates have passed laws 
that punish women if they fail to leave an abusive relationship through state-sanctioned 
routes.”).  
12 Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of 
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (1991) (discussing how legal actors assume it is the 
survivor’s responsibility to leave abusive relationships regardless of emotional attachments).  
13 Mahoney, supra note 12, at 61 (describing “several assumptions about separation: 
that the right solution is separation, that it is the woman’s responsibility to achieve 
separation, and that she could have separated”); see also Rana Fuller, How to Effectively 
Advocate for Battered Women When Systems Fail, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 939, 940 
(2007) (confirming that society tells survivors that leaving is always the right choice and 
often a mandatory choice).  
14 Simon Lapierre, More Responsibilities, Less Control: Understanding the Challenges 
and Difficulties Involved in Mothering in the Context of Domestic Violence, 40 BRIT. J. SOC. 
WORK 1434, 1442 (2010). 
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definitions of parental kidnapping—may also risk exposing her to incarceration, 
termination of parental rights, or loss of custody. 
Parental kidnapping charges are not solely triggered when a parent takes her 
children out of state or out of the country.15 Even a parent who remains in the same 
city or jurisdiction as the other parent is not immune from a parental kidnapping 
claim. For survivors considering leaving unsafe relationships, their decision about 
where to relocate will often be grounded in considerations of safety and stability 
rather than jurisdictional concerns.16 For some survivors, the threat of separation 
violence may mandate that they leave their current home and, in so doing, leave very 
little trace of where they have gone for fear of being followed, stalked, or attacked.17 
Other survivors may need to stay in their communities to avoid disrupting 
employment, childcare, schooling, family relationships, or benefits. Research has 
demonstrated that domestic violence survivors are capable of understanding and 
predicting the unique risks they face in both staying in and leaving their 
relationships.18 Yet in punishing survivors for making decisions that are not 
sanctioned by the state, their experiences and insights are being devalued.19 
Moreover, little government or private funding is available to help domestic violence 
survivors access resources that would help them develop a state sanctioned plan for 
separation.20 
Survivors in violent relationships have to navigate a multisystem legal 
labyrinth: stay and risk state intrusion or leave and risk even more.21 This Article 
                                         
15 Catherine F. Klein et al., Border Crossings: Understanding the Civil, Criminal, and 
Immigration Implications for Battered Women Fleeing Across State Lines with Their 
Children, 39 FAM. L.Q. 109, 119 (2005).  
16 See NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 2 (“[A] parent who is a domestic 
violence survivor may need to relocate for safety”); Klein et al., supra note 15, at 110 (“The 
decision to flee the state may mean an opportunity to live with extended family members 
who will offer a survivor and her children a safe, caring, supportive, and familiar 
environment.”).  
17 Klein et al., supra note 15, at 110.  
18 See, e.g., Margaret E. Johnson, Balancing Liberty, Dignity, and Safety: The Impact 
of Domestic Violence Lethality Screening, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 531 (2010) 
(synthesizing the findings of research on these women’s ability to predict their own risk).  
19 Kitchen, supra note 11, at 376 (articulating the tension between survivors acting in 
accordance with the state versus taking action into their own hands).  
20 Deborah M. Weissman, Law, Social Movements, and the Political Economy of 
Domestic Violence, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 221, 222 (2013) (discussing funding 
priorities in the 2013 reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act); see also Kitchen, 
supra note 11, at 376–77 (describing the constrained choices survivors have when pressured 
to leave without being provided with resources to support separation).  
21 Kitchen, supra note 11, at 385 (discussing the “inhospitable legal labyrinth” that 
survivors encounter when they do try to seek safety through separation). See also LORRAINE 
RADFORD & MARIANNE HESTER, MOTHERING THROUGH DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 142 (2006) 
(describing the “three planets” battered mothers must navigate: the domestic violence 
system, the domestic relations system, and the child welfare system).  
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analyzes how the state constrains battered mothers’ choices and criminalizes many 
of their options, focusing on those survivors who flee with their children.22 Part II 
begins by exploring the myriad ways both civil and criminal court systems pressure 
survivors to leave violent relationships despite the very real danger of separation 
violence. Part III analyzes state parental kidnapping laws and related federal laws, 
discusses how battered mothers may fall within their scope, and emphasizes the 
extreme variations in states’ application of parental kidnapping laws on survivors of 
violence. Part IV examines the risks mothers face after making the choice to separate 
while recognizing that this choice may be state imposed. Part V concludes by 
providing recommendations for lawyers working with separating survivors, 
suggestions for amending state parental kidnapping statutes’ language, and 
proposals for expanding the domestic violence movement’s activism to include a 
more intersectional framework that would benefit survivors, their families, and their 
communities. 
 
II.  STATE PRESSURE TO LEAVE 
 
There are several ways in which civil and criminal legal systems pressure 
domestic violence survivors into leaving their abusive partners: they must leave their 
abusive partners if they want to either invoke state assistance23 or avoid unwanted 
state intervention.24 This pressure to separate permeates many practices now 
considered routine, including law enforcement officers executing mandatory arrest 
and no drop prosecution policies;25 prosecutors including stay away orders in both 
                                         
22 This Article’s scope is limited to survivors who flee within the United States, as this 
phenomenon has received less scholarly attention and may be more feasible for many 
survivors. This is meant not to diminish the experiences of survivors who flee outside of the 
United States. For comprehensive discussions of survivors escaping from domestic violence 
with their children by fleeing internationally, see Julia Alanen, When Human Rights Conflict: 
Mediating International Parental Kidnapping Disputes Involving the Domestic Violence 
Defense, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 49 (2008); Susan Kreston, Prosecuting 
International Parental Kidnapping, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 533 (2001); 
Brian Quillen, The New Face of International Child Abduction: Domestic-Violence Victims 
and Their Treatment Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction, 49 TEX. INT’L L. J. 621 (2014); Merle H. Weiner, International Child 
Abduction and the Escape from Domestic Violence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 593 (2000).  
23 GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 19; ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED 
WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 77 (2000); Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered 
Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 
1018 (2000).  
24 Kitchen, supra note 11, at 385–86. 
25 G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the 
Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 245–46, 265 
(2005).  
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pre and posttrial conditions of release;26 judges denying survivors’ requests to vacate 
civil protection orders;27 abusive partners being granted custody of the children in 
family court;28 and survivors being charged with failing to protect their children.29  
Despite being pressured to separate and punished for staying, there are many 
reasons why survivors may not leave their abusive partners, including love, logistics, 
economic dependence, social and psychological isolation, pressure from family or 
friends, or fear of separation violence.30 Yet most legal systems ignore survivors’ 
agency and insight and instead focus on separation-based remedies.31 
 
A.  Mandatory Arrest and No Drop Prosecution Policies 
 
In the last thirty years, nearly all states and the District of Columbia adopted 
mandatory arrest policies in response to local law enforcement’s consistent failure 
to arrest batterers.32 These policies make it mandatory for officers to arrest if there 
is probable cause to believe that domestic violence has occurred.33 While many saw 
this as a step toward taking domestic violence seriously,34 there is doubt about these 
policies’ effectiveness35 and debate over their fairness.36 Much has been written 
                                         
26 Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 56–60 (2006). Suk notes 
that “state-imposed de facto divorce is so class-contingent that it could be called poor man’s 
divorce.” Id. at 59. 
27 Johnson, supra note 18, at 562–63.  
28 Kitchen, supra note 11, at 397.  
29 See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know that for Sure?: 
Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 223 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. 
L. REV. 7, 21–22 (2004).  
30 See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 23, at 77; Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and 
Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 191, 201–02 (2008); Tamara L. Kuennen, Love Matters, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 977, 990 
(2014); Jody Raphael, Battering Through the Lens of Class, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. 
POL’Y, & L. 367, 371–73 (2002). 
31 GOODMARK, supra note 5, at 9–10; Johnson, supra note 18, at 526; Kitchen, supra 
note 11, at 386 n.75.  
32 Miccio, supra note 25, at 240 n.2; Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA 
L. REV. 741, 757–58 (2007).  
33 Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic 
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1859–60 (1996); Miccio, supra note 25, at 
265.  
34 Miccio, supra note 25, at 265. 
35 See, e.g., Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic 
Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 824–25 (2001); Sue Osthoff, 
But, Gertrude, I Beg to Differ, a Hit Is Not a Hit Is Not a Hit: When Battered Women Are 
Arrested for Assaulting Their Partners, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1521, 1451 n.11 
(2002). 
36 Holly Maguigan, Wading into Professor Schneider’s “Murky Middle Ground” 
Between Acceptance and Rejection of Criminal Justice Responses to Domestic Violence, 11 
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 427, 431 (2003) (observing that “[t]he negative impacts on 
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about their negative impact on marginalized survivors, from increasing the 
likelihood of arrest37 to undermining autonomy.38 
Regardless of these consequences, however, mandatory arrest policies were 
designed to ensure that batterers were swiftly removed from the situation and held 
accountable for their actions.39 They reflect the belief that neither police nor 
survivors should have discretion when it comes to deciding how to respond to 
domestic violence.40 Even if a survivor did not call the police and even if she does 
not wish to see her partner arrested, she has no say in whether he is arrested: she and 
her partner will be separated in the interest of keeping her safe. While many 
survivors reasonably believe that arresting their partners will expose them to more 
violence at the hands of their partners and law enforcement,41 this concern is 
overridden by the state’s desire to separate the parties to immediately remove the 
threat.42 
Both before and after the adoption of mandatory arrest policies, very few 
domestic violence cases were prosecuted.43 The influx of arrests due to mandatory 
arrest policies did not result in a significantly increased number of prosecutions 
because prosecutors were under resourced and unmotivated to pursue a case if a 
victim expressed ambivalence or doubt about moving forward with the case.44 
                                         
communities of color, of all classes, and on poor people, of all ethnicities, were entirely 
predictable many years ago. Racial disparities were already well established throughout the 
criminal justice system at the time battered women’s advocates started working for more 
reliance on the system. They are starker now.”). 
37 Ellen L. Pence & Melanie F. Shepard, An Introduction: Developing a Coordinated 
Community Response, in COORDINATING COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: 
LESSONS FROM DULUTH AND BEYOND 3, 7 (Melanie F. Shepard & Ellen L. Pence, eds., 
1999); Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and 
Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1043 (2000); Gruber, supra note 32, at 
813; Myrna S. Raeder, Preserving Family Ties for Domestic Violence Survivors and Their 
Children by Invoking a Human Rights Approach to Avoid the Criminalization of Mothers 
Based on the Acts and Accusations of Their Batterers, 17 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 105, 110–
11 (2014); Andrea J. Richie, Law Enforcement Violence Against Women of Color, in THE 
COLOR OF VIOLENCE: THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY 138, 140 (INCITE! Women of Color 
Against Violence ed. 2016).  
38 Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory 
Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009); Tamara L. 
Kuennen, Analyzing the Impact of Coercion on Domestic Violence Victims: How Much Is 
Too Much?, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 2, 6 (2013); Miccio, supra note 25, at 293–
94.  
39 See Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case 
but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 191, 215 (2008).  
40 Goodmark, supra note 38, at 3–4.  
41 Coker, supra note 37, at 1042.  
42 See Johnson, supra note 18, at 551.  
43 EPSTEIN & GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 73.  
44 Kohn, supra note 39, at 222–23. 
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Activists in the movement saw this as a reflection of the state’s lack of interest in 
holding batterers accountable.45 To combat this apathy, they advocated for the 
adoption of various no drop prosecution policies, including hard no drop policies 
which require prosecutors to prosecute cases regardless of the complaining witness’ 
wishes or concerns; and soft no drop polices, which encourage prosecutors to stay 
the course and provide some resources to keep victims involved.46 These policies 
became the domestic violence movement’s method of both ensuring that batterers 
were not just arrested but brought to justice and sending a message to the public that 
domestic violence was condemned by the state.47 
No drop prosecution policies reflect the mainstream beliefs that the legal 
system is the most effective way to address domestic violence and that the best way 
for the legal system to combat domestic violence is through keeping the parties 
apart.48 This commitment to legal intervention overlooks the reality that arrest and 
criminal prosecution may actually expose survivors to potential anger, violence, and 
isolation from the defendant.49 When survivors resist this one size fits all model, 
however, they are seen as either helpless and unable to think for themselves50 or 
lying schemers with questionable agendas.51 Survivors thus do not have a choice 
about whether to separate from or stay with their abusive partners once law 
enforcement gets involved: the decision to separate has been made for them by the 
criminal system. 
 
B.  Criminal Stay Away Orders 
 
Once a defendant has been arraigned on criminal domestic violence charges, it 
is common for prosecutors to request conditions of release if the defendant is not 
going to be detained pending trial.52 In domestic violence cases, it is especially 
routine for prosecutors to request that the defendant stay away from and have no 
contact with the complaining witness.53 This means that the defendant could be 
arrested and charged with a new crime—that of violating the conditions of his 
release—if he is found to have texted, visited, or returned to living with his partner.54 
Law professor Jeannie Suk refers to this practice as “state-imposed de facto divorce” 
and has opined on how criminal law is increasingly devoted to intervening in and 
restructuring family life for justice-involved individuals and their partners.55 
                                         
45 EPSTEIN & GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 37; See also Goodmark, supra note 38, at 12.  
46 Goodmark, supra note 38, at 12–13; Miccio, supra note 25, at 266–67. 
47 Miccio, supra note 25, at 265–67.  
48 Goodmark, supra note 29, at 8.  
49 EPSTEIN & GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 76.  
50 Goodmark, supra note 29, at 20; Miccio, supra note 25, at 241. 
51 Kohn, supra note 39, at 202. 
52 Suk, supra note 26, at 16. 
53 Id. at 8. 
54 Id. at 21. 
55 Id. at 8. 
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For a survivor who did not want law enforcement involvement to disrupt or 
determine the fate of her relationship, finding out that her partner is legally 
prohibited from interacting with her can have far reaching emotional56 and economic 
consequences.57 The most immediate consequences of involving the criminal justice 
system in the lives of a survivor are her inability to share a home with, communicate 
with, or even see her partner. In addition, for defendants who blame their partners 
for the arrest or prosecution, involvement in the criminal justice system may also 
cause them to stop providing economic or emotional support—a choice they may 
not have made but for intervention by the criminal legal system. 
A survivor cannot just opt out of participating in the criminal process, however. 
Prosecutors typically subpoena survivors to testify at trial: if a subpoenaed survivor 
does not come to the court date, prosecutors can and do request bench warrants 
against her and move to hold her in contempt of court, which can result in 
incarceration.58  
 
C.  Civil Protection Orders 
 
Survivors who do not want to engage with the criminal legal system and 
manage to evade its reach may nonetheless choose to obtain a civil protection order. 
While not a criminal proceeding per se,59 these civil injunctions can place onerous 
restrictions on the opposing party, including eviction from a shared home, 
requirements not to contact or come near the survivor, and mandatory counseling or 
treatment—often at the opposing party’s expense.60 While survivors petitioning for 
a protection order often select which conditions they wish to have imposed, it is not 
unheard of for judges to include unrequested requirements in the final order. A 
violation of any of the provisions included in a civil protection order can result in a 
                                         
56 For an example of a complaining witness struggling with a stay away order, see Aya 
Gruber, supra note 32, at 743 (describing an interaction with a complaining witness: “Britney 
tells me that she only called the police ‘cause I was mad and wanted him out of the house.’ 
She does not want to pursue charges against Jamal and adamantly refuses to comply with 
any no-contact order. Then, in a more hushed tone, she asks, ‘What if I just leave now and 
don’t show up later—will they drop the case?’”). 
57 Suk, supra note 26, at 57. 
58 Jane K. Stoever, Parental Abduction and the State Intervention Paradox, 92 WASH. 
L. REV. 861, 870–71 (2017). See also Alex Barber, Prosecutor Orders Arrest of Woman as 
Material Witness to Testify Against Her Alleged Abuser, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Sept. 20, 
2013, 9:03 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/2013/09/20/news/state/prosecutor-orders-
arrest-of-woman-as-material-witness-to-testify-against-her-alleged-abuser/ [https://perma. 
cc/5FTU-ES8P]; Jodie Fleischer, Innocent Victim Speaks Out About Being Jailed for 17 
Days, WSB-TV 2 ATLANTA (May 1, 2012, 8:50 PM), http://www.wsbtv.com/news/innocent-
victim-speaks-out-about-being-jailed-17-d/242355608 [https://perma.cc/A4U9-S2QG]. 
59 Many scholars have noted the “quasi-criminal” nature of the civil protection order. 
See, e.g., Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming 
Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1142–50 (2009). 
60 Id. at 1111. 
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criminal prosecution, similar to the violation of a criminal stay away order.61 These 
remedies can benefit a survivor who is able to conceive of how she wants to limit 
her relationship with her partner for a year—or, in many jurisdictions, indefinitely.62 
Some survivors who obtain a civil protection order may find that, for various 
reasons, it is not helping them achieve their goals—for example, providing childcare 
to children, benefiting from a joint income, or reconciling with their partner. 
Protection order beneficiaries who seek to vacate their order are not always able to 
do so.63 Unlike other civil contexts where plaintiffs are able to dismiss no longer 
desired court orders, survivors are often forced to convince judges to permit them to 
modify or vacate their orders.64 It is not uncommon for judges to push back on 
survivors’ requests, or even deny them entirely, refusing to vacate the protection 
order.65 Rather than listen to a litigant’s own expression of agency and desire, judges 
may substitute their values and beliefs about what a survivor needs or how she 
should live her life.66 As a result, when a motion to vacate is denied, a survivor and 
her partner must either comply with the court imposed separation or risk the criminal 
consequences of being in violation of the order.67 
 
D.  Custody Determinations 
 
Given the frequency with which abusive parents request and are granted 
custody in family court cases,68 survivors may choose to stay in abusive relationships 
to maintain access to their children.69 Yet this decision may prove detrimental if 
either parent decides to seek custody of the children either independently or as part 
of a larger dissolution of marriage case. A survivor who claims domestic violence 
or child abuse in a family court setting but did not leave the relationship may be seen 
                                         
61 KATHLEEN J. FERRARO, NEITHER ANGELS NOR DEMONS: WOMEN, CRIME, AND 
VICTIMIZATION 97 (2006). 
62 For information on the length of a protection order in any state, consult the appendix 
included in Jane K. Stoever, Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence 
Protection Orders, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1015, 1093 (2014). 
63 See Johnson, supra note 59, at 1149; Kohn, supra note 39, at 233–34. 
64 See Johnson, supra note 59, at 1149; Kohn, supra note 39, at 233–34. 
65 See Johnson, supra note 59, at 1149; Kohn, supra note 39, at 233–34. 
66 GOODMAN & GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 81. 
67 While it is typically the respondent who faces criminal charges for violating a 
protection order, some judges have threatened to hold victims in contempt as well. Kohn, 
supra note 39, at 230. 
68 Stoever, supra note 58, at 906; Joan S. Meier, Rates at Which Accused and 
Adjudicated Batterers Receive Sole or Joint Custody, DVLEAP.ORG (2013), https://drive. 
google.com/file/d/1hZvruA9pzaH1lEgX0JqRmEdW50ucwALQ/view [https://perma.cc/BA 
96-P7XG] (citing multiple studies that find abusive fathers contest custody twice as often as 
nonabusive fathers and receive custody in more than half of custody cases where abuse is 
alleged). 
69 Kitchen, supra note 11, at 396. 
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as fabricating the abuse in order to gain an advantage in the custody proceedings,70 
which strongly undermines the survivor’s credibility and perceived motives in the 
eyes of a judge untrained or uninterested in the dynamics of domestic violence.71 
Survivors requesting that the other parent receive limited or no access to the children 
may also be viewed as uncooperative,72 which can be seen as a fatal flaw in states 
that have adopted “friendly parenting” statutes that emphasize the importance of 
supportive coparenting.73 A survivor who does not take the steps the family court 
judge deems necessary for collaborative coparenting may be seen as not acting in 
the child’s best interest—even if those choices have been mandated by other court 
systems.74 Survivors who stay in abusive relationships may struggle to be seen by 
the court as good mothers or credible witnesses: these impressions will undermine 
their testimony and their attempts to obtain substantial parenting time and significant 
decisionmaking abilities.  
 
E.  Failure-to-Protect Charges 
 
Survivors who remain in unsafe relationships risk being charged with failing to 
protect their children by exposing their children to domestic violence or child abuse: 
these charges may occur through criminal prosecution, through the child welfare 
system, or both.75 Either proceeding can have devastating effects on survivors, 
ranging from loss of liberty to loss of parental rights. 
                                         
70 Raeder, supra note 37, at 120 (observing that courts may see survivors’ claims of 
child abuse in the custody setting as merely “a litigation tactic”). 
71 Id. at 119 (noting that “commentators consider that judges tend to disbelieve women 
who are victims of domestic violence, whether from stereotypical gender biased views or 
because they believe these women make bad choices that disregard the best interests of their 
children.”); see also Deborah M. Goelman, Shelter from the Storm: Using Jurisdictional 
Statutes to Protect Victims of Domestic Violence After the Violence Against Women Act of 
2000, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 101, 167 (2004) (citing “misconceptions about domestic 
violence” and a tendency to believe that women “lie about abuse” as an explanation of why 
survivors struggle to obtain custody of their children). 
72 Kitchen, supra note 11, at 397. 
73 Kitchen, supra note 11, at 397. 
74 Margo Lindauer, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: Why Multi-Court-
Involved Battered Mothers Just Can’t Win, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 797, 799 
(2012) (discussing how even women who fully comply with orders and expectations placed 
on them by other involved courts may be negatively judged by family court judges who value 
coparenting over separation); Klein et al., supra note 15, at 132–33 (discussing how “friendly 
parenting” provisions and philosophies in custody cases can harm survivors who prioritize 
safety over coparenting); Goodmark, supra note 29, at 27–28 (also arguing that friendly 
parenting policies unfairly impact survivors who are custody litigants). 
75 See, e.g., Justine A. Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child: The Error of 
Pursuing Battered Mothers for Failure to Protect, 50 LOY. L. REV. 565, 567 (2004); Raeder, 
supra note 37, at 110–11.  
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Even if the child or children are not being abused themselves, the survivor may 
nonetheless be criminally charged with failure to protect the children because she 
allowed them to be exposed to her own abuse.76 These charges presuppose both that 
the harm to children directly or indirectly witnessing domestic violence is severe 
and also that this harm is the result of the survivor’s inability to protect the children, 
thus rendering her a bad mother.77 These charges fall under the often overlapping 
categories of child endangerment or neglect,78 which, in some states, includes 
impacting the child’s welfare rather than just the child’s physical safety.79 
                                         
76 See, e.g., Lindauer, supra note 74, at 798; Kitchen, supra note 11, at 383–85. Some 
scholars have suggested that more exposure to domestic violence charges have been filed 
criminally since the Nicholson case in New York curtailed the use of exposure to domestic 
violence as a rationale for removing children from their homes through the child welfare 
system. Nicholson v. Williams, No. 00 CV 2229 JBW, 2004 WL 4780498 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 
5, 2004); see, e.g., David Michael Jaros, Unfettered Discretion: Criminal Orders of 
Protection and Their Impact on Parent Defendants, 85 IND. L.J. 1445, 1460 (2010). 
77 See Dorothy Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. REV. 95, 97–98, 116–18 
(1993). 
78 See Raeder, supra note 37, at 383 n.66.  
79 Many states have statutes written broadly enough to include impact on the child’s 
mental or emotional welfare. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-206(a)(1) (2006) (defining 
endangering the welfare of a minor in the second degree); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-207(a)(1) 
(2006) (defining endangering the welfare of a minor in the third degree); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 273a (1997) (prohibiting willful harm or injury to child, including endangering person or 
health); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-401 (2014) (prohibiting child abuse); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 53-21 (2015) (prohibiting injury or risk of injury to, or impairing morals of, children); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1102, 1102(a)(1)(a) (2017) (prohibiting endangering the welfare of a 
child); IDAHO CODE § 18-1501 (2005) (prohibiting injury to children); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/12C-5 (2013) (prohibiting endangering the life or health of a child); IND. CODE § 35-46-1-
4 (2017) (prohibiting neglect of a dependent); IOWA CODE § 726.6(1)(e) (2017) (recognizing 
domestic violence as an affirmative dense if the defendant had a reasonable fear of serious 
bodily harm); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5601 (2011) (prohibiting endangering a child); MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-602.1 (2011) (prohibiting neglect of a minor); MINN. STAT. 
§ 609.378 (2005) (prohibiting neglect or endangerment of a child); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 568.045 (2017) (prohibiting first degree child endangerment); MO. REV. STAT. § 68.050 
(2017) (prohibiting second degree child endangerment); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-622 
(2007) (prohibiting endangering the welfare of children); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-707(1)(a) 
(2015) (prohibiting child abuse); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.508 (2015) (prohibiting neglect or 
endangerment of a child); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:3(I) (2016) (prohibiting endangering 
the welfare of a child); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1(b) (1987) (prohibiting abuse, abandonment, 
cruelty, and neglect of a child); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-1(D)(1) (2009) (prohibiting the 
abandonment or abuse of a child); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10(1) (2010) (prohibiting 
endangering the welfare of a child); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-22(1) (1957) (prohibiting 
child abuse); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22 (2011) (prohibiting endangering children); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 843.5 (2014) (prohibiting child abuse); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-5-70 
(2008) (prohibiting unlawful conduct toward a child); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(2) 
(2017) (prohibiting injury to a child and recognizing a very specific domestic violence 
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Survivors are especially in danger of being criminally charged with failing to 
protect their children if their children also experience abuse. Many states define child 
endangerment to include allowing or enabling abuse of the children.80 These charges 
                                         
defense); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1304 (1971) (prohibiting cruelty to a child and 
recognizing a domestic violence affirmative defense); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1 (2016) 
(prohibiting abuse and neglect of children); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-403 (1977) (prohibiting 
abandoning or endangering children). Note that the breadth of these statutes indicates the 
possibility of these charges being brought for exposing a child to domestic violence even if 
these states have not pursued this option.  
80 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.100(a)(3) (2013) (prohibiting leaving a child with 
another person when the defendant knows the person has previously mistreated the child); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3623(A)(1) (2009) (prohibiting intentional or knowing child 
abuse); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-221(a) (2003) (prohibiting the reckless permission of abuse 
of a minor and recognizing an affirmative defense for taking remedial measures to end the 
abuse); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a (1997) (prohibiting willful harm or injury to child); COLO 
REV. STAT. § 18-6-401 (2014) (prohibiting permitting a child to be placed in an abusive 
situation); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1102, 1102(a)(1)(b) (2017) (prohibiting endangering 
the welfare of a child); FLA. STAT. § 827.03(1)(b)(3) (2017) (prohibiting “active 
encouragement” of child abuse); HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-903.5(1)(a) (2008) (prohiting 
intentionally or knowingly allowing another person to abuse a child); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 709-904(1)(a) (2008) (prohibiting recklessly allowing another person to abuse a child and 
recognizing a domestic violence affirmative defense); IDAHO CODE § 18-1501 (2005) 
(prohibiting permitting a child to suffer); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12C-5(a) (2013) 
(prohibiting permitting the endangerment of a child); IOWA CODE § 726.6(e) (2017) 
(prohibiting permitting the abuse of a child and recognizing a domestic violence affirmative 
defense); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5601 (2011) (prohibiting causing or permitting the 
endangerment of a child); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 508.100, 508.110, 508.120 (1982) 
(prohitbing permitting abuse when the defendant has actual custody of the child); ME. STAT. 
tit. 17-A, § 554)(B-2) (2015) (prohibiting recklessly failing to protect child from harm); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 § 13J (2010) (prohibiting conduct that creates a substantial risk 
of injury or sexual abuse to a child); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.136b(3)–(7) (2017) 
(prohibiting failure to act causing harm to a child and recognizing a domestic violence 
affirmative defense); MINN. STAT. § 609.378(b)(1) (2005) (prohibiting permitting a child to 
be placed in a situation likely to substantially harm that child and recognizing a domestic 
violence affirmative defense); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-40(1) (1992) (prohibiting knowingly 
condoning felonious abuse—must be more than not reporting); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-
628(1)(b) (2013) (prohibiting placing a child in the physical custody of someone who the 
defendant knows has previously injured the child); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-707(1) (2015) 
(prohibiting permitting child abuse); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.508(2) (2015) (prohibiting 
permitting child to suffer); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:3(I) (2016) (prohibiting violating a 
duty to protect); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1(d) (1987) (prohibiting willful omission causing 
unnecessary pain or suffering); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-1(D) (2009) (prohibiting permitting 
abuse of child); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2(a) (2009) (prohibiting allowing injury to be 
inflicted on child); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-22(1) (2015) (prohibiting allowing abuse of 
child); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.15(B) (2009) (recognizing an affirmative defense for 
when defendant could not prevent the harm and took steps to get help); OKLA STAT. tit. 21, 
§ 852.1(A)(1) (2011) (prohibiting knowingly permitting physical or sexual abuse); OKLA 
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also presume that it is the survivor’s responsibility to prevent abuse: while the 
abusive parent may also be charged with child abuse, the brunt of criminal charges 
related to children often falls on mothers, who are typically seen as responsible for 
protecting their children at any cost.81 Even when the survivor herself has been 
abused by the child’s abuser, she may still receive a substantial sentence for not 
intervening.82 
                                         
STAT. tit. 21, § 843.5(B) (2014) (prohibiting enabling child abuse); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 4304(a)(1) (2017) (prohibiting violating a duty of protection); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-95 
I(B) (2000) (prohibiting inflicting or allowing infliction of great bodily injury against a 
child); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-5-70(A)(2) (2008) (prohibiting causing any bodily harm to be 
done to the child that does or is likely to endanger the child); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-5-80 
(2008) (prohibiting causing unnecessary pain or suffering to be done against a child); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-30 (2006) (prohibiting permitting physical or sexual abuse of a 
child and recognizing a domestic violence affirmative defense); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-
9-1 (1993) (prohibiting contributing to abuse of child); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-401(c)(1) 
(2017) (prohibiting knowingly exposing or failing to protect child from abuse); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 39-13-102(b) (2015) (prohibiting reckless conduct that results in harm to another); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-402(a) (2016) (prohibiting aggravated child abuse, neglect, and 
endangerment); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a) (2017) (prohibiting causing injury to a 
child through omission when the defendant has a duty of care to the child and recognizing a 
very specific domestic violence affirmative defense); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.041 
(2007) (prohibiting endangering or abandoning child by act or omission); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-5-109(2) (2017) (prohibiting permitting child abuse); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1304(a) 
(2017) (prohibiting exposing child to cruelty); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371 (2015) 
(prohibiting causing or encouraging acts rendering a child delinquent or abused); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 18.2-371.1 (2016) (prohibiting abuse of child by act or omission); WIS. STAT. 
§ 948.03(4) (2015) (prohibiting failing to act to prevent bodily harm to child); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 6-4-403(a)(ii) (2012) (prohibiting permitting child endangerment). 
81 Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare 
“Reform,” Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 718 (1998); Evan Stark, A 
Failure to Protect: Unravelling “The Battered Mother’s Dilemma,” 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 
29, 38 (2000) (noting that “a state’s broad responsibility to protect women from assault 
conflicts with the presumptive duty of parents under common law, as well as most states’ 
statutory laws, to provide for their children’s general welfare. In the minds of judges and 
juries, it is unclear when, if ever, women’s rights to safety and autonomy supercede their 
responsibilities as mothers.”); Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for 
Feminist Theory, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 166, 170–74, (Martha 
Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (describing the bad mother trope in 
popular culture and literature as an introduction to a discussion of mothers committing child 
abuse). 
82 Between 2014 and 2015, BuzzFeed News reporter Alex Campbell wrote a series of 
articles exploring how failure to protect laws operate against survivors whose children have 
also been abused. In one article, he chronicles the cases of over 75 survivors who were 
criminally charged with failing to protect their children and received a sentence of at least 
10 years. Alex Campbell, These Mothers Were Sentenced to at Least 10 Years for Failing to 
Protect Their Children from a Violent Partner, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 2, 2014, 8:51 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/alexcampbell/these-mothers-were-sentenced-to-at-least-10-
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In these cases, the factfinder rarely inquires into whether the survivor was 
aware of the abuse or was taking steps to either mitigate the abuse or devise a plan 
to leave the relationship.83 While this Article is not suggesting that battered parents 
should never be held criminally accountable for choices they make regarding their 
children, it is critical to recognize that survivors’ choices receive an immense 
amount of scrutiny compared to those of the abusive coparent.84  
Civil failure-to-protect charges may also be brought against a survivor who 
stays in a violent relationship regardless of whether criminal charges are pursued.85 
Often these cases are brought when a survivor is advised by a child welfare social 
worker to either get a protection order or quickly leave the relationship and she fails 
                                         
years-for-failin?utm_term=.otqWZ1MZg#.cjv4nlxnG [https://perma.cc/74ZR-XQBZ]; see 
also Alex Campbell, Battered, Bereaved, and Behind Bars, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 2 2014, 
8:00 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/alexcampbell/how-the-law-turns-battered-women-
into-criminals?utm_term=.pkPA0zq0g#.tq55gVbg8 [https://perma.cc/A4U9-S2QG] 
(describing Arlena Lindley’s history of abuse and her 45 year sentence after her boyfriend 
murdered her child); Alex Campbell, Woman Sent to Prison for Failing to Protect Toddler 
Is Up for Parole, BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 30 2015, 4:48 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/ 
alexcampbell/woman-sent-to-prison-for-failing-to-protect-toddler-is-up-fo?utm_term=.su 
P097e9z#.kkkyoOPo8 [https://perma.cc/Y6LF-R5YD] (continuing the previous story’s 
discussion of Arlena Lindley in light of her parole hearing); Alex Campbell, How “Failure 
to Protect” Laws Cost a 12-Year-Old Rape Victim His Mother, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 7, 
2014, 5:26 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/alexcampbell/mothers-imprisonment-leads-
rape-victim-to-wish-he-had-never?utm_term=.nnLaE4XEq#.pxJMnqVnj [https://perma.cc 
/QTQ5-EAKN] (analyzing how a victim’s mother received more prison time than did his 
sexually abusive stepfather); Alex Campbell, This Battered Woman Wants to Get Out of 
Prison, BUZZFEED News (Nov. 11, 2014, 1:48 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/alexcampbell/this-battered-woman-wants-to-get-out-of-prison? 
utm_term=.wvPYAZlAD#.snLJx7Nx1 [https://perma.cc/2J2D-MBCP] (again providing 
details into a case where a mother received more prison time than her abusive boyfriend); 
Alex Campbell, Vermont Kills Failure-to-Protect Law, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 18, 2015, 
12:25 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/alexcampbell/vermont-kills-failure-to-protect-
law?utm_term=.ui54rQErX#.ohLwzPpzX [https://perma.cc/FBU4-CKWX] (reporting on 
Vermont’s House of Representatives removed a failure to protect provision from a child 
abuse prevention bill and instead added a domestic violence affirmative defense to its child 
endangerment law). Unsurprisingly, mothers who are not being abused are also being 
prosecuted for their children’s deaths, even when they do not participate in the violence 
directly. For a recent example, see Jordan Owen, Mother of Murdered Toddler Gets 7 Years 
for Child Endangerment, CHI. SUN TIMES (May 9, 2016, 3:26 PM), 
https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/mother-of-murdered-toddler-gets-7-years-for-child-
endangerment/ [https://perma.cc/MX4M-JB7B] (mother who ignored injuries inflicted by 
her boyfriend while she was at work pled to two counts of felony child endangerment after 
the child was murdered). 
83 See Murphy, supra note 81, at 743–61; FERRARO, supra note 61, at 231–35.  
84 See Roberts, supra note 77, at 110–11. 
85 See Kitchen, supra note 11, at 388–89. 
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to do so.86 While cases in the child welfare system cannot result in incarceration 
unless a court order is violated, they nonetheless can have even more long term and 
devastating consequences for a parent: the limiting or outright loss of parental 
rights.87 Similar to criminal charges, failure-to-protect allegations can be made 
against a parent for exposing their child to either domestic violence or child abuse.88  
Although supporters of the child welfare system advocate for state intervention 
as a way to ensure support for unstable families,89 critics have long demonstrated 
the vast disparity in resources going toward removal rather than rehabilitation.90 
More sobering still are statistics showing the unlikeliness of family reunification 
once a child has been removed as well as the risk of harm children in the foster care 
system face.91 For survivors, removing a child from an unsafe home neither 
guarantees safety for the child nor provides the resources she needs to achieve the 
stability necessary to get her child back. Moreover, a growing body of research 
demonstrates that providing assistance and support to survivors is the most effective 
way to keep children safe.92 
Once survivors find themselves involved in the legal system—be it the civil 
system, the criminal system, or both—they may find the terms of their relationships 
dictated not by their own desires, realities, or calculations but by system actors 
including police officers, prosecutors, and judges. Because the pervading philosophy 
within the legal system is that domestic violence is best remedied by separation,93 
survivors may struggle to maintain their preferred lifestyle, relationship, and control 
over their safety once separated.94 A court ordered restriction to contact or come near 
a partner may logistically result in either or both parties needing to reassess their 
                                         
86 Lindauer, supra note 74, at 798. 
87 Raeder, supra note 37, at 108–09. 
88 Lindauer, supra note 74, at 804–05; Dunlap, supra note 75, at 566–67. While the 
publicity of the Nicholson case has been somewhat persuasive in other jurisdictions 
regarding not making exposure to domestic violence the sole reason for child removal, this 
still remains a possibility in some states. Raeder, supra note 37, at 117–18 (noting both the 
influence of Nicholson and its limitations, namely loss of custody even as parental rights are 
maintained). 
89 LINDA SPEARS, BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ORGANIZATIONS 
AND CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES 3–5 (2000). 
90 Raeder, supra note 37, at 121 (discussing the extreme disparity in federal funding of 
child welfare systems, with most going to out of home placement as opposed to preventative 
services). 
91 Murphy, supra note 81, at 712; see also Lindauer, supra note 74, at 811–12 
(discussing both the challenges to reunification and the dangers children are exposed to once 
removed). 
92 See, e.g., ANN ROSEWATER & KATHY MOORE, ADDRESSING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
CHILD SAFETY AND WELL-BEING: COLLABORATIVE STRATEGIES FOR CALIFORNIA FAMILIES: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE CALIFORNIA LEADERSHIP GROUP ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
AND CHILD WELL-BEING 6 (2010). 
93 Kohn, supra note 39, at 200. 
94 See Kitchen, supra note 11, at 388–89. 
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relationship and their living situation. For battered mothers with children, however, 
needing to leave a formerly shared household may not be as simple as moving out 
(which for reasons including finances, family, and the housing market, is not simple 
at all). Survivors are told by the state that they cannot remain with their partners in 
any meaningful way, yet they are not also being provided with either resources or 
reasonable guidelines to facilitate and maintain this state imposed separation. 
Survivors who choose not to leave are punished for not doing so: they may face 
incarceration, suspension or termination of parental rights, or loss of custody. These 
punitive responses to survivors staying in abusive relationships place further 
pressure on survivors to leave the relationship lest they incur these consequences. 
Leaving the relationship, however, by no means guarantees stability, safety, or 
liberty, as survivors who do leave may nonetheless find themselves in violation of 
parental kidnapping laws.  
 
III.  PARENTAL KIDNAPPING LAWS 
 
It is now fairly common knowledge that it takes many survivors multiple 
attempts to be able to successfully extricate themselves from the lives of their 
abusive partners.95 Despite this increasingly widespread recognition, it remains 
critical not to lose sight of the realities underlying these statistics. For survivors of 
domestic violence, both deciding to leave and actually separating from an abusive 
partner can be extremely difficult.96 There are many factors that survivors must 
consider and there are myriad reasons why a survivor might rationally decide that 
                                         
95 This fact is found in numerous, easily accessible, introductory discussions and 
explanations of domestic violence. See, e.g., 50 Obstacles to Leaving, NATIONAL DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE HOTLINE (June 10, 2013) http://www.thehotline.org/2013/06/10/50-obstacles-to-
leaving-1-10/ [https://perma.cc/K868-KJDW]; Sarah LeTrent, When A Friend Won’t Walk 
Away from Abuse, CNN (Jan. 10, 2013, 1:53 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/10/living/ 
friend-domestic-abuse/index.html [https://perma.cc/W4VX-VNY8]; Domestic Violence, 
BUILDING FUTURES (2017), http://www.bfwc.org/domestic_violence.php [https://perma.cc/ 
GJK9-X9B5]. This concept gained even more traction after NFL star Ray Rice was filmed 
knocking his soon-to-be wife Janay Palmer out in an elevator in 2014; see, e.g., Sarah 
Kaplan, #WhyIStayed: She Saw Herself in Ray Rice’s Wife, Janay, and Tweeted About It. So 
Did Thousands of Others, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/morning-mix/wp/2014/09/09/whyistayed-she-saw-herself-in-ray-rices-wife-janay-
and-tweeted-about-it-so-did-thousands-of-others/?utm_term=.b94c21428b42 [https://perma 
.cc/GWP7-AWPU]; Nina Bahadur, #WhyIStayed Stories Reveal Why Domestic Violence 
Survivors Can’t ‘Just Leave,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 9, 2014, 12:24 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/09/whyistayed-twitter-domestic-violence_n_579 
0320.html [https://perma.cc/U9HJ-CUGD]; Kathy A. Bolten, Leaving for Good Often Takes 
7 to 9 Tries, DES MOINES REGISTER (Sept. 14, 2014, 1:25 AM), 
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2014/09/14/domestic-abuse-leaving-good/ 
15621169/ [https://perma.cc/K7GW-N6YH]. 
96 SCHNEIDER, supra note 23, at 77; GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 80. 
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staying in the relationship is the most strategic choice.97 When survivors do leave, 
these same considerations may make it challenging—if not impossible—to remain 
separated. Survivors who share children with their abusive partners, this calculus 
can be even more complicated logistically, financially, and emotionally.98  
Nonetheless, survivors with children who do choose to separate from and 
leave—whether on their own volition or because of pressure exerted by either the 
domestic violence legal response or by other state systems—must navigate their 
children’s survival as well as their own against the backdrop of both separation 
violence that undermines their safety and state parental kidnapping laws that 
threaten their liberty.  
Separation violence has long been recognized as a phenomenon that occurs 
when an abusive partner forcefully reasserts control over a survivor who has 
attempted to leave.99 Separation violence is common at the end of abusive 
relationships and provides insight into why some survivors decide it is most strategic 
to return to or stay in the relationship.100 For survivors who anticipate or have already 
experienced separation violence, it may also underscore the need for ensuring a clean 
break or putting distance between themselves and their partners.101 
Analyzing the impact of state parental kidnapping laws on battered mothers is 
especially critical given its interplay with state pressure to leave and separation 
violence. The term “kidnapping” typically connotes images of children or adults 
being forcefully removed from their homes and held in seclusion against their will, 
                                         
97 As discussed supra note 95, the #WhyIStayed hashtag has given readers who may be 
less familiar with domestic violence scholarship tremendous insight into the realities of 
battered women’s lives and decisions about separating. Other mainstream articles exploring 
this topic and hashtag include: Val Willingham, Why I Stayed: Tangles of Domestic Abuse, 
CNN (Sept. 16, 2014, 8:43 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/09/health/domestic-abuse-
willingham/index.html [https://perma.cc/L7N3-5PNV]; Michele Hunt, Out of the Closet on 
Domestic Abuse: Why I Stayed, Why I Left and Why I Choose Now to Tell My Story, 
HUFFINGTONPOST (Sept. 12, 2014, 9:39 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/michele-
hunt/domestic-abuse-why-i-stayed_b_5809290.html [https://perma.cc/9VWW-YYQ5]; 
Franchesca Ramsey, 14 Tweets Answer ‘Why I Stayed.’ 11 Broke My Heart, But the Last 3 
Gave Me Hope, UPWORTHY (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.upworthy.com/14-tweets-answer-
why-i-stayed-11-broke-my-heart-but-the-last-3-gave-me-hope [https://perma.cc/F46C-
LZAS]; Julie Lee, #WhyIStayed: Powerful Stories of Domestic Violence, USA TODAY (Sept. 
10, 2014, 1:44 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/09/10/why-i-
stayed-hashtag-twitter-ray-rice/15385027/ [https://perma.cc/JP95-9BJ3]; see also 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 23, at 77; Coker, supra note 37, at 1017–18; Kuennen, supra note 
38, at 4–5. 
98 Miccio, supra note 25, at 263; Mahoney, supra note 12, at 23; Coker, supra note 35, 
at 832; Dunlap, supra note 75, at 580.  
99 See Mahoney, supra note 12, at 5. See also Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or 
Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence, and Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE 
VIOLENCE 59, 79 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mayktiuk eds., 1994).  
100 See generally Mahoney, supra note 12, at 5. 
101 See Klein et al., supra note 15, at 110.  
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often for the kidnapper’s monetary or sexual gain.102 Parental kidnapping, on the 
other hand, conjures up images of bitter custody battles and vindictive parents 
absconding with their children out of state or out of the country.103 In reality, parental 
kidnapping laws are triggered by a much broader range of circumstances. It is not 
just a disgruntled, disappointed litigant whose flagrant contempt of a court order 
triggers a parental kidnapping statute. Rather, states proscribe different behaviors by 
different subsets of people with different states of mind and subject them to different 
punishments.104 Furthermore, some states directly address the possibility of fleeing 
domestic violence by including specific exemptions to prosecution and affirmative 
defenses in their statutes while others do not. Depending on where they live, 
survivors with children may be caught in a serious bind in which they may be 
criminally punished for both staying and leaving an abusive relationship. There is 
very real potential for unfair and arbitrary outcomes based on geography, which 
underscores the need for these laws to be written and implemented in ways that do 
not harm parents or children fleeing from unsafe homes. 
 
A.  Required Relationships 
 
Because states’ definitions of parental kidnapping vary greatly, the first step in 
determining the applicability of a parental kidnapping law is to analyze what legal 
relationships the state is requiring between the fleeing parent, the abusive parent, 
and the child.105 Not all states share the same conception of parental custody. That 
is, in some states, parents automatically have joint custody over a child until a court 
says otherwise106 while other states’ de facto position is to deny any custody to 
fathers who are unmarried.107 Biological mothers will typically have a right to 
custody unless a custody or child welfare court orders otherwise. That a mother has 
this right does not necessarily mean that she will fall within the scope of every 
parental kidnapping law. 
As scholars and advocates Catherine Klein, Leslye Orloff, and Hema 
Sarangapani noted over a decade ago, parental kidnapping statutes typically fall into 
three categories of applicability: statutes that only apply when a custody or visitation 
                                         
102 In fact, 33 of the top 34 images that come up when searching “kidnap” on a Google 
image search show people restrained by rope, duct tape, or hands and three include weapons 
(on file with author). The one image that differs only depicts the bust of a man.  
103 Many of the top Google images for “parental kidnapping” show custody related 
images or images of children torn between two parents (on file with author).  
104 See Klein et al., supra note 15, at 117 (observing that “the statutory provisions 
concerning definitions of lawful custodian, the availability of statutory exceptions or 
defenses, and the severity of the criminal penalty for conviction vary greatly between 
states”).  
105 Id. 
106 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 125C.0015 (2015).  
107 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-17-20(B) (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-303 
(1997).  
 
2018] CRIMINALIZING BATTERED MOTHERS 279 
proceeding has already been initiated; statutes that apply regardless of the existence 
of a family court case; and statutes with ambiguous applicability.108 For a survivor 
living in states where parental kidnapping requires at least the initiation of a family 
court case,109 a lack thereof would render her immune from parental kidnapping 
charges, though the act of leaving may still be used against her in civil actions.110 It 
is important to recognize the very real possibility that a survivor has already sought 
help from the court system before she decides to flee. Whether through a divorce, 
custody, or protection order hearing, a survivor or her abusive partner may have 
sought temporary or permanent care and control over their children. Despite the 
existence of such a case, a survivor who is still being battered—or feels like she or 
the children are still in danger—may choose to leave rather than wait for her partner 
to comply with a court order.111 
In states where parental kidnapping charges can be brought regardless of the 
existence of a family court case, survivors are at risk of prosecution even when they 
are not in violation of a court order. In several states, only a person with “no legal 
right” to custody can be charged with parental kidnapping.112 This language and 
similar variations create ambiguity over whether a mother can have “no legal rights” 
to custody of her biological children without a family or child welfare order denying 
her custody or terminating her parental rights. Moreover, in a few states, only a 
person who removes a child from a legal custodian and/or deprives a legal custodian 
of a right to custody has committed parental kidnapping.113 
                                         
108 See Klein et al., supra note 15, at 118–19.  
109 These states include: Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-502(a)(1) (2017); 
Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-304(1) (2017); Louisiana, LA. STAT. ANN. 
14:45.1(A) (2017); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.350a(1) (2017); Mississippi, MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 97-3-51(1) (2017); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-320.1 (2017); North 
Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-24 (2017); Rhode Island, 1956 R.I GEN. LAWS § 11-26-
1.2(a) (2017); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-495(a)(1) (2017); South Dakota, 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19-9 (2017); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-303(b),(c) (2017); 
Virginia, VA CODE ANN. § 18.2-49.1(A),(B) (2017); and West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 61-
2-14d(a) (2017). 
110 Id.; see also Part III, infra.  
111 Klein et al., supra note 15, at 110. (noting that even survivors with protection orders 
may still experience abuse, prompting their departure).  
112 These states include: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.320(a) (2017); Arizona, ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1302(A) (2017); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-98(a) (2017); 
Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 785(1) (2017); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN., § 16-5-
45(b)(1) (2017); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 18-4506(1) (2017); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 509.070(1) (2017); Nebraska, NEB. REV. ST. § 28-316(1); New York, N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 135.45(1) (2017); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.23(A) (2017); Vermont, VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 13, § 2451(a) (2017); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-204(a) (2017). 
113 These states include: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 13A-6-45(a) (2017); Kansas, KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 21-5409(b) (2017); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 3-503(a) (2017); 
New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. § 633:4(I) (2017); and Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
21, § 891 (2017).  
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These distinctions seriously affect survivors with children. In those states 
requiring court involvement, survivors who have not engaged with the family court 
system would be better able to determine their relocation without risking 
prosecution. Similarly, in states like Tennessee where mothers of children born out 
of wedlock are assumed to have sole custody,114 battered mothers will have more 
leeway in determining how best to respond to the violence at home. In many states, 
however, battered mothers’ decisionmaking may result in action prohibited by their 
state’s parental kidnapping laws.  
 
B.  Prohibited Acts and Enhanced Punishments 
 
Every state proscribes variations of a parent abducting, concealing a child, or 
interfering with court ordered custody. In addition, many states provide enhanced 
punishments for doing so outside the state. For survivors fleeing violence, however, 
staying within states lines is not likely to outweigh the benefits of leaving if other 
states offer greater access to support networks, safety, or employment 
opportunities.115 
Many states specifically prohibit removing a child from that state116 or include 
enhanced punishments for doing so.117 In addition to actions amounting to parental 
                                         
114 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-205 (determining that “[a]bsent an order of 
custody to the contrary, custody of a child born out of wedlock is with the mother”).  
115 See Klein et al., supra note 15, at 110. 
116 ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.320 (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-45(b)(1)(c)-(2) (2017); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-726(1)(a)(ii)&(1)(c) (2017); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5(b)(5) 
(2017); IND. CODE § 35-42-3-4(a)(1)&(a)(2) (2017); IOWA CODE § 710.6 (2017); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 21-5409(b)(2)(C)-(E) (2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:45(A)(4) (2017); ME. 
STAT. tit. 17-a, § 303(1)(B)-(C) (2017); MD CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 9-304, 9-305 (2009); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-51 (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-632 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 200.359 (2017) (removing the child from the jurisdiction of the court, not the state 
specifically); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 633:4(I) (2017); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.50 
(McKinney 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-320.1 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-18-05 
(2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 891 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.257 (2017); 1956 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS 11-26-1.1 (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19-10 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
13-306 (2017); TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.03 (2017) (taking the child out of the judicial district 
or county); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-49.1 (2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47(D) (2017); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.40.060(1)(c)–(d) (2017).  
117 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-502(b)(1) (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1302(E) 
and 13-1305(B) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-45(b)(1)(c)-(2) (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 707-726(1)(a)(ii)&(1)(c) (2017); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5(b)(5) (2017) (prohibiting 
refusal to return child to Illinois after out of state visitation); IND. CODE 35-42-3-4(a)(1)–(2) 
(2017); IDAHO CODE § 18-4506(2) (2017); IOWA CODE § 710.6 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 21-5409(b)(2)(C)-(E) (2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:45(A)(4) (2017); ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, 
§ 303(1)(B)-(C) (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 265, § 26A (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-
3-51 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 565.150 and 565.153 (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-
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kidnapping being punishable by the survivor’s state of origin, some states also 
criminalize bringing and retaining an abducted child into that new state from a 
different state.118 Fleeing from one state into another may thus result in a survivor 
being charged in two states for parental kidnapping. 
For survivors fleeing violent relationships, considerations about where to go 
are determined far more by safety, resources, and support networks than by state 
boundaries. Yet in many states, they risk far greater punishment if they seek 
sanctuary outside of that state. Survivors who conceal their children from the other 
parent can only hope that their state provides alternate mechanisms to avoid either 
arrest or conviction for intra or interstate parental kidnapping.  
 
C.  Exemptions and Defenses 
 
Many states provide exemptions from prosecution or affirmative defenses 
against conviction to defendants who quickly return their children to the other 
parent. Encouraging actions that rectify the kidnaping makes sound policy sense in 
situations outside of the domestic violence context. But for families experiencing 
domestic abuse, these options are not useful to survivors who commit to their 
separation for more than just a few days.119 
                                         
632 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.23 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-303 (2017); 
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-14d(b) (2017). 
118 See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 565.156(1)(4) (2017); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-
5(b)(9) (2017); MINN. STAT. § 609.26 (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 26A(1)(5) 
(2017). Missouri and Illinois have identical affirmative defenses for when the defendant is 
fleeing domestic violence (including child abuse), whereas Minnesota only has an 
affirmative defense for protecting the child.  
119 In Tennessee, it is an affirmative defense to custodial interference if the defendant 
voluntarily returns the child prior to the issuance of an arrest warrant. TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 39-13-306(c)(2) (2017). Michigan’s child taking statute states that an adoptive or 
biological parent “shall not take that child, or retain that child for more than 24 hours, with 
the intent to detain or conceal the child from any other parent or legal guardian of the child 
who has custody or parenting time rights under a lawful court order at the time of the taking 
or retention.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.350a(1) (2017). In New Jersey, if the child is 
detained, concealed, taken, or enticed for longer than 24 hours or outside of the United States, 
the act is chargeable as a crime of the second degree as opposed to a crime of the third degree. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-4 (2017). In Arizona, charges of custodial interference may be 
dropped from a class three felony to a class one misdemeanor if the child is voluntarily and 
safely returned within 48 hours. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1302(E) (2017). Idaho provides 
an affirmative defense for a defendant who returns the child within 24 hours “after expiration 
of an authorized visitation privilege.” IDAHO CODE § 18-4506(2) (2017). In Minnesota, a 
deprivation of parental or custodial rights case must be dismissed if the child is voluntarily 
returned within 48 hours or the defendant both stays in Minnesota and, within seven days of 
taking the child, either the defendant or the complainant files a motion in family court. MINN. 
STAT. § 609.26(5) (2017). Indiana’s interference with custody statute provides that, if a 
defendant returns the child within 7 days after the violation of a court order, the judge may 
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In contrast, survivors will find far greater protection in a state that provides 
specific mechanisms for considering domestic violence or child abuse when 
investigating or deciding parental kidnapping charges. Seventeen states specifically 
include an exemption or affirmative defense for fleeing domestic violence or child 
abuse in at least one of their parental kidnapping statutes,120 while fourteen only 
                                         
consider this return a mitigating circumstance. IND. CODE § 35-42-3-4(c) (2017). In Texas, 
it is an affirmative defense if the child is returned to the district or country where the child 
was removed within three days of the offense. TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.03(c) (2017). In 
Wisconsin, this time limit to return a child to another legal custodian after court ordered 
parenting time or visitation is only 12 hours. WIS. STAT. § 948.31(1)(b) (2017). Maryland’s 
and Washington, D.C.’s parental kidnapping laws both include provisions prohibiting a 
parent who initially had lawful possession of the child to detain the child for more than 48 
hours after that lawful possession ended and the lawful custodian requested the child’s return. 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 9-304(2), 9-305(2) (2017); D.C. CODE § 16-1022(b)(3) 
(2017). Montana’s parenting interference statute specifically states that, for an individual’s 
first offense, that individual does not commit the crime if he or she does not leave the state 
and returns the child before arraignment or, alternatively, does leave the state but returns the 
child before arrest. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-634(3) (2017). Pennsylvania’s interference 
with custody of children statute also reduces that crime from a third degree felony if the act 
consisting of interference was done in good cause and for less than 24 hours, if the defendant 
has been given some amount of custody or visitation through a valid Pennsylvania court 
order, and the defendant both lives in Pennsylvania and did not remove the child from the 
state: 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2904(c)(2) (2017). See also NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra 
note 3, at 20 (noting that this practice is “unlikely to provide any legal protection” to 
survivors.).  
120 13 states provide statutory affirmative defenses to all of their parental kidnapping 
related laws for parents fleeing from either harm to the child or harm to themselves. 17 states 
have at least one parental kidnapping statute with an exemption or affirmative defense for 
defendants whose actions were based in either protecting themselves or protecting their 
children. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1302 (2017), but no defense for ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-1305 (2017); CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.5 (2017), but no defense for CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 278 (2017); D.C. CODE § 16-1023 (2017); IDAHO CODE § 18-4506 (2017); IND. 
CODE § 35-42-3-4 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 609.26(2) (2017); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 565.153, 
565.156 (2017), but no defense for MO. REV. STAT. § 565.150 (2017); N.J. STAT. 
ANN.§ 2C:13-4 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.359 (2017); 1956 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-26-
1.2, 11-26-1.1 (2017), separate defense for 1956 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-26-1.4 (2017), which 
involves kidnapping a minor against his will; TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.03 (2017), but no 
defense for TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.04 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-303 (2017); WASH. 
REV. CODE §§ 9A.40.060, 9A.40.070 (2017); WIS. STAT. § 948.31 (2017). Florida, Illinois, 
and Pennsylvania each have at least one statute with an affirmative defense for domestic 
violence and child abuse and at least one statute with only an affirmative defense for child 
abuse. FLA. STAT. § 787.03 (2017) covers both but FLA. STAT. § 787.04 (2017) only covers 
child abuse; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5 (2017) covers both but 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-
5.5 (2017) only covers child abuse; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2909 (2017) covers both but 18 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2904 (2017) only covers child abuse. 
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consider flight to protect the child.121 Nineteen include no specific consideration for 
either domestic violence or child abuse.122 Finally, Montana’s interference and 
aggravated interference with parent child contact statutes provide an exemption from 
violating those laws when a defendant acts with “reasonable cause,” which may 
allow for considerations of domestic violence or child abuse but does not specifically 
require that they be taken into account.123 
 
1.  Protecting the Child 
 
The states that recognize the relevance of protecting children from child abuse 
in parental kidnaping cases do so in very different ways, albeit all in the form of 
affirmative defenses. The largest distinctions between the affirmative defenses 
involve the kind of harm to the child that satisfies the defense; the immediacy of the 
                                         
121 14 states’ statutes provide affirmative defenses for protecting only the child but not 
the fleeing parent. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-501 (2017) (interference with visitation—but not 
interference with custody or interference with court ordered custody); COLO REV. STAT. 
§ 18-3-304 (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-726 (2017) (custodial interference in the first 
degree—but not second degree); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:45.1 (2017) (interference with the 
custody of a child—but none for simple kidnapping, which explicitly applies to parents); 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 9-304, 9-305 (2017), but none for MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
LAW § 3-503 (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.350a (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 633:4 
(2017); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.50 (2017) (custodial interference in the first degree—but not 
second degree); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.23 (2017) (interference with custody); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 21, § 567A(B) (2017) but none for OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 891 (2017); 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. §§ 2904, 2909 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-306 (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 2451 (2017); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-14d (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-204 (2017). As 
noted above, Illinois has one statute carving out a defense for protecting only a child, 720 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5.5 (2017), and one statute with a defense for fleeing domestic 
violence generally, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5 (2017), which could also include a child. 
Finally, Florida’s statute provides a defense for protecting a child or a parent but limits this 
defense to protecting the child only if the child is taken out of state. FLA. STAT. § 787.03 
(2017) (interference with custody—protecting both child and parent); FLA. STAT. § 787.04 
(2017) (removing minors from state or concealing minors contrary to state agency order or 
court order—protecting child). 
122 AL, CT, DE, GA, IA, KS, KY, ME, MD, MA, MS, NE, NM, NC, ND, OR, SC, SD, 
VA. Note that several of these states may have statutes with defenses for nonabuse related 
factors like obtaining consent, returning the children, or the other parent failure to assert his 
custody rights in a set amount of time.  
123 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-633(1) (2017). While this exemption applies to 
interference with parent child contact and aggravated interference with parent child contact 
charges, it does not apply to parenting interference or custodial interference violations. These 
statutes provide only an exemption for first time offenses when the child is quickly and 
voluntarily returned. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-304(3), 45-5-634(3) (2017). A variation 
thereof is also available as a defense under the interference with parent child contact laws. 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-633(2) (2017).  
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harm; and whether any steps must be taken by the survivor either before or after her 
departure. 
Some states’ affirmative defenses provide that the harm to the child that a 
parent is fleeing from must be physical injury.124 Other states offer a broader 
definition of harm, essentially allowing a parent to flee to protect a child’s safety or 
welfare.125 In these states, a survivor would be able to provide a broader range of 
evidence that her child was endangered, even if that danger was not in the form of 
physical injury.126 
In addition to defining the harm required to invoke an affirmative defense, some 
states also require that the imposition of that harm must be immediate.127 An 
imminence requirement undermines a survivor’s ability to plan a strategic and 
uneventful departure; rather, she must wait until the child is in actual danger before 
departing. 
                                         
124 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-501(c)(1) (2017), which states that it is an 
affirmative defense in an interference with visitation prosecution that the defendant 
committed the acts in question to “protect the minor from imminent physical harm” so long 
as the defendant was reasonable in her belief that physical harm was imminent and her 
withholding of visitation rights was a reasonable response to the perceived harm. This same 
defense is not available for defendants being prosecuted for interference with custody.  
125 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-304(3) (2017) (stating that the defendant need 
only prove that she “reasonably believed that [her] conduct was necessary to preserve the 
child from danger to his welfare”); see also LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:45.1(A) (2017) (stating that 
it is a defense to Louisiana’s interference with the custody of a child statute “that the offender 
reasonably believed his actions were necessary to protect the welfare of the child”); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 135.50(2) (2017) (“It shall be an affirmative defense to a prosecution . . . that 
the taking was necessary in an emergency to protect the victim because he has been subjected 
to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.23(c) (2017) 
(“It is an affirmative defense to a charge of enticing or taking under division (A)(1) of this 
section, that the actor reasonably believed that the actor’s conduct was necessary to preserve 
the child's health or safety.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.350a(7) (2017) (the defendant must 
prove that “her actions were taken for the purpose of protecting the child from an immediate 
and actual threat of physical or mental harm, abuse, or neglect”).  
126 That is, rather than being restricted to only putting on evidence that the child was in 
actual physical danger, the defendant would be able to provide more holistic evidence and 
testimony about the general safety and welfare of the child being compromised, thereby 
presenting a more detailed picture of the circumstances that led the parent to flee.    
127 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-501(c)(1) (2017) (stating that it is an affirmative 
defense in an interference with visitation prosecution that the defendant committed the acts 
in question to “protect the minor from imminent physical harm”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 633:4(III) (2017) (stating that the defendant must have been “acting in good faith to protect 
the child from real and imminent danger”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-306(C)(1) (2017) 
(providing an affirmative defense when “the person who removed the child or incompetent 
person reasonably believed that, at the time the child or incompetent was removed, the failure 
to remove the child or incompetent person would have resulted in a clear and present danger 
to the health, safety, or welfare of the child or incompetent person”). 
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Many states also require that the defendant take certain steps to alert law 
enforcement or family court judges to the child’s location.128 Some of these 
requirements are extremely onerous in terms of both timing129 and what actions must 
be taken.130 In these states, the defendant must not only attempt to resettle herself 
and her children in a new place, search for work, enroll her children in school, and 
determine childcare arrangements,131 all while looking for signs that her abusive 
partner has found her—she must also consult with a lawyer in order to be made 
aware of these requirements and time limits. She must further hope that, at trial, the 
judge will agree with her assessment of the dangers her children faced prior to her 
move. 
Although these fourteen states do provide an avenue for survivors to avoid 
parental kidnapping convictions when their actions have been borne out of actual or 
threatened child abuse, a narrow interpretation of these defenses by the court can 
                                         
128 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 567A(B) (2017) (“The offender shall have an 
affirmative defense if the offender reasonably believes that the act was necessary to preserve 
the child from physical, mental, or emotional danger to the child’s welfare and the offender 
notifies the local law enforcement agency nearest to the location where the custodian of the 
child resides.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-204(c)(1) (2017) (providing an affirmative defense 
when the defendant’s action “was necessary to preserve the child from an immediate danger 
to his welfare”). 
129 See, e.g., MD CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-306 (2017) (requiring a detailed petition 
to be filed within 96 hours of the flight); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 633:4(III) (2017) (requiring 
that the defendant demonstrate that she was “acting in good faith to protect the child from 
real and imminent physical danger,” and noting that evidence of good faith may include “the 
filing of a nonfrivolous petition documenting such danger and seeking to modify the custody 
decree in a court of competent jurisdiction within this state. Such petition must be filed within 
72 hours of termination of visitation rights.” While this is an example of the kind of proof 
the court is looking for, both its specificity and its very short timeline indicate the challenges 
of being able to access this defense during a time of transition.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 633:4(IV) (2017) (stating explicitly the defense is not available to any defendant who took 
the child out of state); VT. STAT. ANN. § 2451(c) (2017) (providing a substantively identical 
affirmative defense to New Hampshire law). 
130 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-726(2) (2017) (requiring that a survivor invoking 
the defense must have “filed a report with the clerk of the family court detailing the 
whereabouts of the minor, the person who took, enticed, detained, concealed, or removed the 
minor or child, and the circumstances of the event as soon as the filing of the report was 
practicable; and provided further that the person asserting the affirmative defense also filed 
a request for a custody order as soon as the filing of the request was practicable.” Given that 
“practicable” is not defined in statute or case law, this affirmative defense requires the 
defendant to have taken a series of steps that could jeopardize her safety and still not be 
deemed by the court to have been undertaken quickly enough). 
131 Coker, supra note 35, at 836 (“Women who separate need money for new housing—
first and last month rent plus deposit, new childcare arrangements, new school enrollment, 
and a new job. Many women must make these arrangements while using inadequate and 
unreliable public transportation.”).  
 
286 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
result in their protection being denied to survivors.132 And, despite the long 
established link between abusing partners and child abuse,133 survivors whose 
children have not been abused or who are unaware of their children’s abuse would 
not be able to benefit from these affirmative defenses at all.134 
 
2.  Protecting the Child or the Fleeing Parent 
 
Survivors have better chances of achieving lasting safety and independence in 
states that explicitly consider the role their abuse played in their decisions and 
actions. Better yet, rather than relying only on affirmative defenses at trial, several 
states provide exemptions for survivors of domestic violence: rather than providing 
an affirmative defense at trial, some statutes include measures that are meant to 
prevent certain survivors from being arrested or prosecuted.135 For example, the 
District of Columbia provides an exemption and an affirmative defense within its 
parental kidnapping statute.136 Florida, however, is the only state to provide both an 
exemption137 and an affirmative defense138 for defendants charged with interference 
                                         
132 NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 17.  
133 See Peter G. Jaffe, Children of Domestic Violence: Special Challenges in Custody 
and Visitation Dispute Resolution, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILDREN: RESOLVING 
CUSTODY AND VISITATION DISPUTES, A NATIONAL JUDICIAL CURRICULUM 19–31 (Janet 
Carter et al., eds., 1995) (estimating that approximately 30% of abusive partners also abuse 
their children). 
134 NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 22–23. 
135 Id. 
136 See D.C. CODE § 16-1023(a)(1)–(2) (2017) (stating that the parental kidnapping 
statute does not apply to a defendant whose action “[i]s taken to protect the child from 
imminent physical harm . . . [or] [i]s taken by a parent fleeing from imminent physical harm 
to the parent . . . .” ). D.C. CODE § 16-1023(b)-(c) (2017) (providing that if the survivor can 
convince a police officer or a prosecutor of the existence of imminent physical danger to 
either herself or her child, she should be able to avoid prosecution all together. If a survivor 
does violate the parental kidnapping statute, the statute provides that she can file a petition 
with the court stating that a lack of action would have resulted in “clear and present danger 
to the health, safety, or welfare of the child” and also attempt to obtain or modify a custody 
order—if she does this within five days of the action constituting parental kidnapping and 
the court finds that the child was in fact in clear and present danger, she will have a complete 
defense to parental kidnapping charges. In D.C., a survivor is entitled to avoid prosecution 
if she can demonstrate that she was fleeing from imminent physical harm but, if the harm 
was either not physical or not imminent, she loses this opportunity. While the statute provides 
a back end fix for defendants taking their children away from child abuse, this same defense 
does not exist for survivors of domestic violence). See also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2909(a) 
(2017) (providing an exemption in the child concealment statute based on domestic violence 
or child abuse). But see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2904(b)(1) (2017) (providing only an 
affirmative defense in its separate interference with custody statute if the action was taken to 
protect the child).  
137 FLA. STAT. § 787.03(6)(b)(1)–(3) (2017). 
138 FLA. STAT. § 787.03(4)(a)–(b) (2017). 
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with custody. This statute provides both front and back end fixes for parents fleeing 
from either child abuse or domestic violence. Interestingly, if the child is taken out 
of Florida against a court order, the defendant can only avail an affirmative defense 
regarding fleeing child abuse.139 If the survivor is choosing to both defy a court order 
and leave the state, only the child’s safety is explicitly recognized as relevant.140 
California,141 Rhode Island,142 Illinois,143 and Texas144 each also provide exemptions 
to prosecution based on violence to the child or the mother. 
According to practitioners surveyed by the NCDBW, these exemptions are 
promising because “when the system works as intended, a victim is not 
charged . . . . This allows survivors to remain in refuge states with their children, 
pending the results of civil custody cases.”145 On the other hand, practitioners have 
also reported that only some survivors have benefited from the exemptions due to 
                                         
139 FLA. STAT. § 787.04(5) (2017).  
140 This is a prime example of mothers’ identities and safety being prioritized below 
both that of their children and the integrity of a court.  
141 CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.7 (2017) (providing an exemption based on child abuse or 
domestic violence for deprivation of custody assuming that, in either case, leaving the child 
with the abusive parent would result in “immediate bodily injury or emotional harm.”); see 
generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 278 (2017) (providing an exemption for the child’s suffering, 
not the mother’s, even if the mother is experiencing abuse. In addition to this inquiry, the 
survivor must take several steps to avail herself of this exemption: within 10 days, she must 
make a report to the original jurisdiction’s district attorney regarding her explanation for her 
actions as well as her and her children’s contact info, within 30 days, she must begin a PKPA 
compliant custody case, and she must continue to update the original district attorney with 
changes in contact info. There are no similar exemptions or affirmative defenses for a parent 
with no legal right to custody who is accused of parental kidnapping.).  
142 See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-26-1.2(b)(1)–(2) (2017) (protecting from prosecution 
actions “taken to protect the child from imminent physical harm; . . . [or] taken by a parent 
fleeing from imminent physical harm to himself or herself”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-26-1.1 
(2017) (providing an affirmative defense for fleeing family violence, which includes child 
abuse and domestic abuse).  
143 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5(b)(6) (2017) (providing a specific exemption for 
concealing a child his father, who is or was married to the survivor, on account of entering 
into a domestic violence program. This same statute also provides affirmative defenses for 
fleeing family violence, which includes both child abuse and domestic violence). But see 720 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5.5(g)(1) (2017) (providing an affirmative defense related to violence 
only when “a person or lawful custodian committed the act to protect the child from 
imminent physical harm, provided that the defendant’s belief that there was physical harm 
imminent was reasonable and that the defendant’s conduct in withholding visitation rights, 
parenting time, or custody time was a reasonable response to the harm believed imminent.”).  
144 TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.03(c-2)(2) (2017) (“[F]leeing the commission or attempted 
commission of family violence, as defined by Section 71.004, Family Code, against the child 
or the person.”); TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.04 (providing no related affirmative defenses and 
no exemptions or defenses). 
145 NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 20.  
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the onerous steps many require of survivors to quickly undertake without any legal 
or financial assistance.146 
Arizona,147 Idaho,148 Indiana,149 Minnesota,150 Missouri,151 New Jersey,152 
Utah,153 Washington,154 and Wisconsin155 all provide an affirmative defense based 
on acts intended to protect either the mother or the child. As with statutes that only 
provide affirmative defenses for child abuse, these affirmative defenses also differ 
in terms of imminence, harm, and proactive steps required to invoke them.156 Even 
with these provisions, proving imminence and harm in court may still be challenging 
                                         
146 NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 20; see also JOHNSTON ET AL., supra 
note 6, at 5 (noting that “[d]espite California’s affirmative defense for parents who take their 
children to flee violence, not all cases involving domestic violence were identified and 
provided protection under this defense”). 
147 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1302 (2017) (requiring the defendant to file for a 
protection order or custody claiming that the child is unsafe and has a good faith and 
reasonable belief that the child is in immediate danger with the other parent based on either 
child abuse or domestic violence); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1305 (2017) (providing no 
affirmative defenses). 
148 See IDAHO CODE § 18-4506(2)(a)–(b) (2017) (protecting either the child or the 
parent from imminent physical harm). 
149 See IND. CODE § 35-42-3-4(f) (2017) (applying when defendant was threatened or 
reasonably believes that the child was threatened). 
150 See MINN. STAT. § 609.26 subdiv. 2(1)–(2) (2017) (“[T]he person reasonably 
believed the action taken was necessary to protect the child from physical or sexual assault 
or substantial emotional harm . . . or the person reasonably believed the action taken was 
necessary to protect the person taking the action from physical or sexual assault.”). 
151 See MO. REV. STAT. § 565.160 (2017) (“[F]leeing an incident or pattern of domestic 
violence,” which includes violence to the child or survivor); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.150 
(2017) (providing no alternative defenses). 
152 See N.J. STAT. ANN § 2C:13-4(c) (2017) (stating that for reasonable belief of 
imminent danger to the child’s welfare, requires giving notice and contact info within 24 
hours to the sheriff, prosecutor, or child welfare agency of the original jurisdiction; for 
reasonable belief of imminent danger toward the defendant, must quickly give notice as 
above or begin a custody case). 
153 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5(6)(b) (2017) (stating that a reasonable belief that the 
action is necessary to protect the child from abuse). But see UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-305(a) 
(providing a more generally applicable defense when it is reasonably necessary to protect 
any other person from imminent bodily harm or death). 
154 See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.40.080 (2017) (“The defendant’s purpose was to 
protect the child, incompetent person, or himself or herself from imminent physical harm, 
that the belief in the existence of the imminent physical harm was reasonable, and that the 
defendant sought the assistance of the police, sheriff’s office, protective agencies, or the 
court of any state before committing the acts giving rise to the charges or within a reasonable 
time thereafter . . . .”). 
155 See WIS. STAT. § 948.31(4)(a)(1)–(2) (2017) (stating that one must reasonably 
believe in threat of physical harm or sexual assault to child or to defendant herself). 
156 NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 22. 
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depending on the survivor’s access to evidence. Even when a survivor may be able 
to successfully invoke an affirmative defense and avoid conviction, she cannot assert 
the defense until trial and must therefore experience arrest and possible pretrial 
detention and separation from her children even if she prevails at trial.157 
 
3.  Using the Common Law Necessity Defense 
 
A minority of states provide no affirmative defenses based on domestic or child 
abuse in any of their parental kidnapping statutes.158 In many of the states with no 
specific defenses for fleeing child abuse or domestic violence, defendants could 
attempt to invoke the affirmative defense of necessity.159 Without an explicit 
statutory defense, however, they may face an uphill battle in proving that the 
hypothetical harm of staying in the relationship was greater than the actual harm of 
depriving a parent of their right to see their child.160 Moreover, case law regarding 
this defense frequently emphasizes that it may only be invoked when the defendant 
had no other means to address the harm and when her illegal action was the only 
“viable and reasonable” option.161 Courts may hold a defendant’s failure to involve 
the police or the court system against her because of her failure to exhaust those 
options before fleeing.162 Practitioners have reported that many survivors have not 
been able prevail under necessity defenses.163 
The very fact that twenty states do not explicitly address child abuse or 
domestic violence demonstrates how the impact of domestic violence on survivors 
with children has not been comprehensively integrated into criminal law. The ways 
in which other states have attempted to address the interrelationship of domestic 
violence and parental kidnapping further highlight how this nexus remains largely 
unincorporated: protections are piecemeal and rarely recognize the intersecting 
demands on survivors fleeing violence. Although a total of thirty one states and 
Washington, D.C. provide some kind of protection for defendants fleeing to protect 
their children, they do so with vastly different elements, requirements, and burdens 
                                         
157 Id. 
158 Parental kidnapping statutes in Alabama, Connecticut, Deleware, Georgia, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachuetts, Nebraska, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Virginia 
contain no explicit affirmative defense grounded in domestic or child abuse.   
159 But see ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.330(b) (2017) (providing that the affirmative defense 
of necessity in a second degree custodial interference prosecution is explicitly not applicable 
to a defendant who keeps a child for whichever is shorter: 24 hours or “the time necessary to 
report to a peace officer or social service agency that the child or incompetent person has 
been abused, neglected, or is in imminent physical danger.”). 
160 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (U.L.A. 2017). 
161 NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 18–19. 
162 Id. at 18.  
163 Id.  
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of proof.164 The seventeen states that also provide protection to a defendant who is 
in danger also run the gamut in terms of when the protection first applies, what must 
be proved, and what action is required from the defendant. Given these disparities 
and challenges in the ways that even protection for survivors are written, it is no 
surprise that their application has also been ineffective.165 Survivors may not be able 
to effectively invoke those protections ostensibly intended for their benefit; law 
enforcement, prosecutors, judges, and juries may also be unfamiliar with both these 
mechanisms and dynamics of domestic violence more broadly.166 Survivors may 
struggle to access and to prevail under legal tools created for them. Involvement 
with the criminal court system can create extensive and long lasting barriers for 
survivors who choose to separate from their abusive partners—and these 
consequences are even more severe for those survivors who are convicted of parental 
kidnapping. These barriers multiply for survivors whose decisions to leave implicate 
federal as well as state laws.  
 
D.  Intersection with Federal Laws 
 
Survivors who choose to relocate out of state may experience the adverse 
consequences of additional state and federal custody laws. The two most prominent 
jurisdictional laws that are likely to be implicated in a survivor’s flight to a different 
state are the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 
(“UCCJEA”)167 and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (“PKPA”).168 The 
UCCJEA itself is not a federal law: rather it is a model jurisdictional statute adopted 
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1997.169 
As of 2016, the District of Columbia and every state except Massachusetts have 
enacted state level versions of the UCCJEA.170 Massachusetts continues to operate 
under the older Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”)171 which the 
                                         
164 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-4(c)(1) (2017) (requiring the child protection 
affirmative defense be proved by clear and convincing evidence—the same is not explicitly 
required to invoke the self protection affirmative defense but may be presumed).  
165 NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 24. 
166 Id.  
167 UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 1, 9 pt. 1 U.L.A. 
pp. 257–94 (1999 Supp.). 
168 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2017).  
169 UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON 
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, LEGISLATIVE FACT SHEET—CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND 
ENFORCEMENT ACT, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Child%20Custody%20Jurisdi
ction%20and%20Enforcement%20Act [https://perma.cc/E73K-X7VQ ] (last visited Aug. 
28, 2017).  
170 Id.  
171 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209B (2017). 
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UCCJEA was created to amend.172 State level versions of the UCCJEA are 
jurisdictional statutes, which means that they do not address the merits of a custody 
case but rather provide a framework for state family courts to determine which state 
has jurisdiction to hear and decide a custody case.173 This framework creates a 
jurisdictional analysis that is consistent across the states and district that have 
adopted it, and lays out three types of child custody jurisdiction: home state 
jurisdiction; more appropriate forum jurisdiction; and default jurisdiction.174 The 
majority of cases fall under home state jurisdiction. 
A state court has home state jurisdiction when the child and a parent have lived 
in that state for at least six months prior to an initial custody case being filed.175 
Home state jurisdiction takes priority over other forms of jurisdiction, but a critical 
aspect of the UCCJEA is its allowance for a non home state court to grant temporary 
emergency jurisdiction in situations when the child in question, her sibling, or her 
parent has been abused by the other parent.176 This allows a fleeing survivor to file 
for custody or a modification of an existing custody order on a temporary basis 
without having to return to a court in her home state.177 
There is no guarantee, however, that a non home state court will grant 
temporary emergency jurisdiction or that a home state will decline jurisdiction. In 
either case, the survivor may be forced to return to the state she fled to litigate the 
custody case.178 That means a survivor who has marshalled the physical and 
emotional resources to flee an abusive relationship could be required to return to the 
state she fled to litigate a custody case. Her presence back in the home state can 
disrupt her attempts to rebuild her and her children’s lives and reexpose her to her 
abusive partner. Although the UCCJEA provides a mechanism for fleeing survivors 
to potentially receive temporary or even permanent custody orders from their new 
state, choosing to initiate this process requires taking a “calculated risk” considering 
the legal and nonlegal consequences that doing so may set into motion.179 
                                         
172 Joan Zorza, The UCCJEA: What Is It and How Does It Affect Battered Women in 
Child-Custody Disputes, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 909, 909 (2000).  
173 Klein et al., supra note 15, at 113.  
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 113–14.  
177 For the new state’s temporary emergency jurisdiction to control beyond temporary 
orders, a court in the original state must decline jurisdiction: the UCCJEA provides several 
rationales for denial of jurisdiction that take the survivor’s domestic violence and safety into 
account. Klein et al., supra note 15, at 114. See also Zorza, supra note 172, at 917–18 (noting 
the distinctions in process for when a custody case has or has not already been filed in the 
state from which the survivor fled). 
178 See Leigh Goodmark, Going Underground: The Ethics of Advising a Battered 
Woman Fleeing an Abusive Relationship, 75 UMKC L. REV. 999, 1005 (2007) (noting the 
possibility that the survivor may be forced to reveal her location in the course of the custody 
litigation).  
179 See Zorza, supra note 172, at 920.  
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A survivor may also be subject to the PKPA.180 The PKPA is a federal law that 
requires every state and tribal land grant full faith and credit to custody orders issued 
in other states and tribal lands so long as the order meets due process requirements 
and jurisdictional mandates laid out in the law.181 The PKPA was enacted “to 
discourage interstate conflicts over custody, deter interstate abductions, and promote 
cooperation between states about interstate custody matters.”182 As such, courts must 
defer to the PKPA when deciding whether to enforce a custody order from another 
court or tribe when considering exercising jurisdiction despite the existence of a 
pending custody matter in another state, or when determining whether to modify an 
existing order from another jurisdiction.183 
Although the PKPA is not a criminal statute, its relationship to the federal 
Fugitive Felon Act (“FFA”) may expose survivors to being detained on federal 
warrants and extradited back to their original jurisdiction.184 In all of the many states 
where parental kidnapping out of state is a felony, out of state flight can trigger this 
law addressing interstate flight to avoid prosecution or testimony.185 The FFA allows 
federal agents to issue warrants for individuals who have committed felonies and 
fled across state lines, and to extradite that individual back to the original state when 
located.186 FBI agents have been known to track individuals to domestic violence 
shelters, resulting in their return to the state from which they fled.187 
Because there is no tool for screening victims of domestic violence out of this 
process, survivors who flee the state are at risk of detention, extradition, and further 
abuse—as are their children, who are often returned to the abusive parent.188 In 
conjunction with the unpredictable and often harsh consequences of the state 
parental kidnapping laws themselves, federal laws implicated by fleeing survivors 
create additional challenges and potential for harm.  
 
IV.  RISKS OF LEAVING 
 
Regardless of whether survivors are aware of the existence or the consequences 
of parental kidnapping laws, many choose to not just separate from their abusive 
partners but to take the children and flee, undermining the abusive parents’ 
relationships with their children. Whether survivors, for example, enter a shelter, 
move in with family or friends across town, or leave the state or country entirely, 
they are at risk of having their abusive coparent call the police to file charges against 
them. Even if survivors can get the charges dropped or succeed on an affirmative 
                                         
180 See Goodmark, supra note 178, at 1004; NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, 
at 10; Klein et al., supra note 15, at 116. 
181 See Zorza, supra note 172, at 912.  
182 Klein et al., supra note 15, at 116. 
183 See Klein et al., supra note 15, at 116. 
184 See id.; Goodmark, supra note 178, at 1004.  
185 See 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (2012). 
186 NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 9–10.  
187 Id. at 10 (citing the Clearinghouse’s own practitioner survey from 2003).  
188 Id. at 11.  
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defense, the act and fact of the arrest can have far reaching consequences. For 
survivors who are not able to meet the burden of proving an affirmative defense at 
trial—whether statutory or common law—conviction and incarceration, in addition 
to arrest, can wreak havoc on their lives moving forward. 
 
A.  Criminal Exposure 
 
If the survivor’s abusive coparent alerts the police of their absence and an arrest 
warrant is issued or if law enforcement encounters the fleeing family otherwise, the 
survivor may be arrested. The potential consequences of an arrest, even if there is 
ultimately no conviction, may include violence at the hands of law enforcement; the 
collateral consequences of an arrest record; and the children being taken into the 
child welfare system or, perhaps even more detrimental, being returned to the 
abusive parent.  
 
1.  Arrest 
 
Violence and mistreatment by law enforcement against potential suspects and 
even nonsuspects has recently become a well known and well documented 
phenomenon.189 Although far too many men—especially black men—are being 
killed by police, women—especially black women—are also being murdered and 
assaulted in indefensibly high numbers and are receiving far less media attention.190 
                                         
189 For an incredibly detailed daily log documenting local incidents of police 
misconduct, see CATO INSTITUTE, NATIONAL POLICE MISCONDUCT REPORTING PROJECT 
(2017) http://www.policemisconduct.net/ [https://perma.cc/98T7-WXSB]. 
190 See, e.g., Wesley Lowery, Aren’t More White People than Black People Killed by 
Police? Yes, But No, WASH. POST (July 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
post-nation/wp/2016/07/11/arent-more-white-people-than-black-people-killed-by-police-
yes-but-no/?utm_term=.aedb7c01d3dd [https://perma.cc/4YEN-56K8] (both providing an 
analysis that the rates of black people shot by police is significantly higher than that of white 
people and also failing to include any discussion about specific female victims among the 
discussion of several male victims); Linda Sheryl Greene, Before and After Michael Brown—
Toward an End to Structural and Actual Violence, 49 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 13–15 
(2015) (discussing the racialized nature of law enforcement violence against individuals). 
See also Julia Craven, Koryn Gaines, A 23-Year Old Mother, Latest Black Woman Killed by 
Police, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 2, 2016, 3:13 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry 
/korryn-gaines-shooting_us_57a0cfbfe4b08a8e8b5f9fd4 [https://perma.cc/A8ZE-4SZV] 
(describing the recent killing of Korryn Gaines and noting that 2016 is on pace to see more 
black women killed by police than 2016); Zoe Carpenter, The Police Violence We Aren’t 
Talking About, THE NATION (Aug. 27, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/police-
violence-we-arent-talking-about/ [https://perma.cc/2QTE-NJPB]. See also Erick A. Paulino, 
Deconstructing the Arrest of Sandra Bland, THE FEMINIST WIRE (Aug. 4, 2015), 
http://www.thefeministwire.com/2015/08/deconstructing-the-arrest-of-sandra-bland/ 
[https://perma.cc/3T44-ZQ4U] (arguing that “in challenging racial profiling and police 
brutality against people of color, #BlackLivesMatter activism must pay particular attention 
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Short of being murdered, women experience other forms of violence, mistreatment, 
and abuse of authority at the hands of police officers—especially women of color,191 
women who transgress social and gender norms,192 and women who do not 
automatically and respectfully submit to police authority.193 From the potential for 
physical194 or sexual violence195 to the discomfort and humiliation of the arrest 
itself,196 this process can traumatize a survivor197 and remind her all too clearly of 
the abuse she is attempting to leave behind. If the arrest takes place in front of the 
                                         
to how police exercise force differently for men and women, as well as for LGBT+ people, 
especially transgender individuals and others whom are variously gender non-conforming.”); 
Chaedria Labouvier, How Many Viral Videos Will It Take? Another Reminder of the 
Vulnerability of the Black Girl in America, ELLE (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.elle.com/ 
culture/career-politics/a31527/do-we-need-another-video-to-remind-us-that-black-girls-are-
the-most-vulnerable/ [https://perma.cc/4LQ4-M93E] (asking “[d]o we need more videos of 
black girls dragged across school floors and front lawns to know that this is how black 
women are treated when they have the misfortune of encountering the police and the white 
male rage that so often seems part and parcel of the job?”). But see Homa Khaleeli, 
#SayHerName: Why Kimberlé Crenshaw Is Fighting for Forgotten Women, THE GUARDIAN 
(May 30, 2016, 10:02 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/may/30/sayher 
name-why-kimberle-crenshaw-is-fighting-for-forgotten-women [https://perma.cc/NZK9-
8XMB] (describing law professor, scholar, and activist Kimberlé Crenshaw’s campaign to 
raise awareness about women killed by the police).  
191 See generally ANANNYA BHATTACHARJEE, WHOSE SAFETY? WOMEN OF COLOR 
AND THE VIOLENCE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2001) (discussing and documenting violence 
against women of color by law enforcement in both the criminal and immigration contexts).  
192 See Richie, supra note 37, at 143.  
193 See Osthoff, supra note 35, at 1533; SUSAN L. MILLER, VICTIMS AS OFFENDERS: 
THE PARADOX OF WOMEN’S VIOLENCE IN RELATIONSHIPS 27–28 (2005).  
194 See Richie, supra note 37, at 147; see generally ANDREA J. RICHIE, INVISIBLE NO 
MORE: POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK WOMEN AND WOMEN OF COLOR (2017) 
(examining both historical trends of police brutality against women of color and recent 
examples of women of color murdered by police). 
195 See Richie, supra note 37, at 149; BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 191, at 33–36; 
Carpenter, supra note 190; Steven Yoder, Officers Who Rape: The Police Brutality Chiefs 
Ignore, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Jan. 19, 2016, 5:03 AM), 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2016/1/19/sexual-violence-the-brutality-that-police-
chiefs-ignore.html [https://perma.cc/V5KJ-L7YL]; Kim Kelly, When Police Officers Rape, 
AL JAZEERA: OPINION (Oct. 31, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/nypd-
rape-cases-171030110833155.html [https://perma.cc/2HVP-GTQG]. 
196 See Simiao Li et al., Women’s Perspectives on the Context of Violence and Role of 
Police in Their Intimate Partner Violence Arrest Experiences, 30 J. INTERPERSONAL 
VIOLENCE 400, 412–13 (2015) (regarding survivors’ arrests in the domestic violence context, 
describing the negative consequences of an arrest, including humiliation, job loss, legal 
consequences, and loss of confidence in law enforcement). 
197 See BETH RICHIE, COMPELLED TO CRIME: THE GENDERED ENTRAPMENT OF 
BATTERED, BLACK WOMEN 6 (1996) (noting that the women she interviewed described being 
arrested as both interruptive and traumatic). 
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survivor’s children, the children also run the risk of being not only traumatized 
themselves, but also taken into the custody of the child welfare system while their 
mother is detained.198 Once in the child welfare system, the children will either be 
placed with a relative (including the abusive parent the family was fleeing) or into 
foster care.199 If the nonabusive parent does have some form of custody of the 
children, it is probable that they will be returned to that parent. 
Although not nearly as far reaching as those that follow a conviction, even an 
arrest may generate informal collateral consequences. For example, depending on 
how long someone is detained, she may miss a job interview and no longer be in 
consideration, miss work and be fired, or miss other critical appointments. Her 
mugshot may be publicly available on the internet and may show up on background 
checks done by potential or current employers.200 If she is on probation, parole, or 
supervised release, an arrest may cause her to miss a mandated meeting; moreover, 
a new arrest (even without a conviction) is enough to form the basis of a supervision 
revocation and send her back to jail or prison. If she is undocumented and her status 
is reported to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, her arrest may also trigger 
deportation proceedings if she has already been ordered to leave the United States. 
These ramifications intensify if the survivor is convicted of parental kidnapping or 
custodial interference. 
 
2.  Conviction and Incarceration 
 
In addition to arrest, being detained pretrial or incarcerated postconviction—
even briefly—can intensely impact survivors. Once incarcerated, a woman has little 
to no independence or freedom; she has no agency and has to rely on others’ 
permission or generosity to meet even her most basic needs.201 It is not unusual for 
female prisoners to feel isolated, alienated, and afraid.202 Women’s jails and prisons 
are also the site of a great deal of violence at the hands of corrections officers, fellow 
prisoners, and themselves.203 Although the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003204 
was enacted to end sexual harassment and assault of prisoners, female prisoners are 
still assaulted and abused by prison staff. For survivors fleeing violence, being 
                                         
198 See CLARE M. NOLAN, CHILDREN OF ARRESTED PARENTS: STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE 
THEIR SAFETY AND WELL-BEING 8 (2003); Raeder, supra note 37, at 119. 
199 See BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 191, at 44.  
200 See Michael Polatsek, Extortion Through the Public Record: Has the Internet Made 
Florida’s Sunshine Law Too Bright?, 66 FLA. L. REV. 913, 949 (2014). 
201 See RICHIE, supra note 197, at 8. 
202 See id. at 7. 
203 Julia Sudbury, Gender Violence and the Prison Industrial Complex: Interpersonal 
and State Violence against Women of Color, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT THE MARGINS: 
READINGS ON RACE CLASS, GENDER, AND CULTURE 102, 108–09 (Natalie J. Sokoloff ed., 
2005). 
204 42 U.S.C. § 15601 (2012). 
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incarcerated can aggravate past trauma and replicate survivors’ past abuse.205 
Unfortunately, most women’s jails and prisons lack the trauma informed therapeutic 
programming that could help prisoners develop healthy coping mechanisms.206 
Medical units are also underequipped and hard to access for treatment of preexisting 
or newly developed physical and mental health problems.207 Finally, most states 
have fewer women’s jails and prisons, which means that, for many women, they will 
be incarcerated far from their homes.208 This distance can make it more challenging 
for female prisoners to keep in touch with their families or see their children.209 
When a survivor finishes her sentence for parental kidnapping, which can range 
from a few days to several years, she may find that her conviction ushers in a host 
of collateral consequences. Collateral consequences are restrictions and limitations 
that flow from the existence of a person’s criminal conviction.210 Beginning in the 
1980s, Congress and state legislatures passed measures limiting returning citizens’ 
eligibility for welfare and food stamps, public housing, driver’s licenses, 
employment licenses, and student loans.211 Limitations on employment, parenting, 
and voting rights were also enacted and expanded.212 Each restriction is detrimental 
in its own right but the consequences of their combination are devastating.213 For a 
reentering survivor trying to reunite with her children, policies that limit access to 
cash benefits or subsidized housing will severely undermine her ability to achieve 
                                         
205 See BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 191, at 37; see also Angela Davis, The Color of 
Violence Against Women, COLORLINES 4 (Oct. 10, 2000, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.colorlines.com/articles/color-violence-against-women [https://perma.cc/N335-
AR25]; Stephanie S. Covington, The Relational Theory of Women’s Psychological 
Development: Implications for the Criminal Justice System, in FEMALE OFFENDERS: 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES AND EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS 135, 148 (Ruth T. Zaplin ed., 2d 
ed. 2008). 
206 See Beth E. Richie, Challenges Incarcerated Women Face as They Return to Their 
Communities: Findings from Life History Interviews, 47 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 368, 375 
(2001). For a description of this phenomenon by a returning citizen, see WOMEN’S PRISON 
ASS’N, IMPROVING OUTCOMES FOR WOMEN IN REENTRY: A POLICY STATEMENT BY THE 
WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT 3 (2006).  
207 Richie, supra note 206, at 373–74.  
208 See Deseriee A. Kennedy, “The Good Mother”: Mothering, Feminism, and 
Incarceration, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 161, 178 (2012).  
209 See id.; Ruth T. Zaplin & Joyce Dougherty, Programs that Work: Mothers, in 
FEMALE OFFENDERS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES AND EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS 463, 466 
(Ruth T. Zaplin ed., 2d ed. 2008) (1998); Naomi R. Cahn, Battered Women, Child 
Maltreatment, Prison, and Poverty: Issues for Theory and Practice, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 355, 359 (2002). 
210 See JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF 
PRISONER REENTRY 63–64 (2005). 
211 See LEGAL ACTION CTR., AFTER PRISON: ROADBLOCKS TO REENTRY: A REPORT ON 
STATE LEGAL BARRIERS FACING PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 8 (2004). 
212 See id. at 8. 
213 See id. at 23.  
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her goals.214 For survivors whose children were put into foster care upon her 
incarceration, federal laws focused on permanency and adoption may undermine or 
completely negate these efforts at family unification.215 For reentering survivors and 
all returning citizens, collateral consequences make it extremely challenging to 
successfully reintegrate into society after incarceration.216 
Survivors coming home from jail or prison, especially those who are on some 
form of probation, parole, or supervised release, also face another gender specific 
challenge: a heightened vulnerability to domestic violence.217 Because of the 
extensive obligations placed on them by the terms of their community supervision, 
combined with the restrictions of formal collateral consequences and the informal 
challenges inherent in reconnecting with family and friends, reentering survivors 
may find themselves relying heavily on their abusive partners to stay afloat.218 This 
confluence of factors may render it extremely challenging to leave, should the abuse 
begin again, and nearly impossible to do so with children, especially if they are 
living with or in the custody of the abusive partner. As such, some abusive partners, 
aware of the even greater power differential, may take advantage of or trade on the 
control they have over their partners while the survivors find themselves even less 
able to seek help or gain independence.219 
 
B.  Civil Consequences 
 
Survivors with arrest records face immense scrutiny and disbelief from judges 
hearing their custody cases, even when they present evidence regarding domestic 
violence.220 Even if the survivor is not arrested or convicted of parental kidnapping, 
deciding to flee with children can have legal consequences outside of the criminal 
justice realm, most notably in the custody context. If the survivor flees in the absence 
of a preexisting custody order, her abusive partner may seek and obtain a custody 
                                         
214 See Raeder, supra note 37, at 107. For a discussion of the federal policies, see 
MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, DRUG TESTING AND 
CRIME-RELATED RESTRICTIONS IN TANF, SNAP, AND HOUSING ASSISTANCE (2016). 
215 See Cahn, supra note 209, at 364–65 (discussing the federal Adoption and Safe 
Families Act and its effects on incarcerated mothers). 
216 See LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 211, at 8–9; see also MARC MAUR & VIRGINIA 
MCCALMONT, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A LIFETIME OF PUNISHMENT: THE IMPACT OF THE 
FELONY DRUG BAN ON WELFARE BENEFITS 7 (2013), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/A-Lifetime-of-Punishment.pdf [https://perma.cc/A29L-8JS8] 
(observing that collateral consequences “would be difficult to manage under any 
circumstances . . . for people who are trying to reenter society after a period of incarceration, 
they are particularly damaging.”).  
217 See Courtney Cross, Reentering Survivors: Invisible at the Intersection of the 
Criminal Legal System and the Domestic Violence Movement, 31 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & 
JUST. 60, 83–87 (2016). 
218 See id. at 82. 
219 See id. at 83–85, 99. 
220 See Raeder, supra note 37, at 119–20. 
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order in her absence that grants the abusive partner both potentially extensive time 
with, or even custody of, the child, which itself often also requires contact with the 
survivor.221 If the nonfleeing parent is the first to obtain a court order, a survivor 
who flees out of state is bound to encounter challenges to obtaining custody based 
on the UCCJEA, which provides state courts a framework for deciding when to 
accept or reject jurisdiction over a child custody case based on analysis of the child’s 
home state.222 
If the survivor flees with her child and a custody order is already in place, the 
survivor risks not only having the terms severely modified in her absence but also 
being held in contempt of court.223 Because family courts place such a high priority 
on coparenting and rarely deny one parent access to a child entirely, a survivor’s 
decision to circumvent the legal process for determining custody will make her look 
like a recalcitrant and uncooperative parent.224 As such, in a custody or modification 
proceeding, she is less likely to fare well under a best interest analysis which 
considers a parent’s willingness to coparent.225 Further, if a temporary or final order 
is in place, a survivor who flees with her children risks violating that order and being 
punished not just by unfavorable custody provisions but also by being held in 
contempt of court.226 Contempt of a court order can be punishable by both fines and 
incarceration. A survivor may face jail time for violating a court custody order 
especially—but not exclusively—if she has already been convicted of parental 
kidnapping by a criminal court. 
Considering all the challenges that can spring from committing acts 
constituting parental kidnapping or custodial interference, a survivor may decide to 
flee without her children. In this case, however, a court may interpret this choice not 
as a compromise to protect herself without disrupting her children but as 
abandonment of the child or as an indicator that she is not willing or able to protect, 
provide, or care for her children.227 The survivor thus still risks being cut off from 
her children in the family court setting. Given the massive risks, challenges, and 
legal consequences of fleeing domestic violence with her children, a survivor may 
rationally decide that the most reasonable decision is to stay in the relationship.  
                                         
221 Lindauer, supra note 74, at 798–99 (discussing how most family courts emphasize 
joint contact with both parents and frown upon one parent attempting to prevent interactions 
between the child and the other parent). 
222 See supra Part II.4. 
223 See Klein et al., supra note 15, at 131–35. 
224 See id. 
225 See id; see also DeCamp v. Hein, 541 So.2d 708, 712 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) 
(reversing and remanding a trial court’s order that a survivor who fled Florida to New Jersey 
must return with her children but also ordering a hearing to determine the father’s visitation 
rights); Yelena R. v. George R., 326 P. 3d 989, 999–1000 (Alaska 2014) (affirming the trial 
court’s decision to grant sole physical and legal custody to an allegedly abusive father after 
the mother and child left Alaska without the father’s consent). 
226 See Klein et al., supra note 15, at 135; see also Goodmark, supra note 178, at 1005 
(noting the realities of facing contempt of court for survivors who not just flee their abusive 
partners but attempt to do so by going underground and hiding their identities completely). 
227 Klein et al., supra note 15, at 133–34; Goodmark, supra note 178, at 1005. 
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V.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
Examining the criminal, civil, and nonlegal consequences a battered mother 
may encounter while navigating an abusive relationship sheds light on both the role 
the state plays in pressuring survivors to separate and the power that courts have to 
punish survivors who do not respond to their abuse in a state sanctioned manner. 
Along with calling the police and initiating criminal actions and federal warrants, a 
survivor’s abusive partner is also able to punish her for leaving through the civil 
legal system by triggering child welfare investigations and by filing for, or moving 
to modify, child custody orders based on her departure with the children. In addition 
to undermining survivors’ agency, liberty, and safety, children are also at risk: 
whether children are returned to their abusive parent or placed in the foster care 
system, their physical, psychological, and emotional health and development may 
be endangered. In such circumstances, it is critical to weigh the potential benefits 
and harms of these placements against those inherent in remaining with the abused 
survivor. 
To combat these undesirable and often dangerous outcomes, domestic violence 
activists and scholars should provide legal system actors with a more comprehensive 
understanding of the relationship between criminal and civil systems; advocate for 
state governments to reform laws and policies that negatively affect survivors of 
violence and their families; and encourage society to shift the scrutiny and blame 
currently reserved for survivors onto batterers instead. There are no doubt myriad 
ways to work toward these goals. This Article, however, focuses explicitly on a 
nonexhaustive set of recommendations to ameliorate the challenges faced by 
survivors fleeing violence with their children: namely, increased awareness of the 
impact of parental kidnapping statutes among lawyers working with survivors; 
thoughtful reform of parental kidnapping laws; and a broader recognition by the 
domestic violence movement of the cost of state involvement in survivors’ lives.  
 
A.  Best Practices for Attorneys 
 
Attorneys working with survivors of domestic violence are likely to encounter 
legal issues outside of the protection order sphere. Many domestic violence attorneys 
are also well versed in family law. It is important for these attorneys to have a 
breadth of family law knowledge beyond the custody and divorce statutes and 
practices in their jurisdiction.228 Knowledge of federal statutes, especially the 
UCCJEA, the older UCCJA, and the PKPA is critical.229 Law professor Catherine 
Klein and her colleagues advise that attorneys working with survivors contemplating 
leaving the state be familiar with a host of intersecting family, criminal, and 
immigration laws and policies in both the new state and the future state.230 
                                         
228 See, e.g., NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 25. 
229 See Klein et al., supra note 15, at 121; Goodmark, supra note 178, at 1004–06. 
230 See Klein et al., supra note 15, at 148–51. 
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While this advice has been explicitly given to attorneys whose clients are 
considering fleeing the state,231 most of it also applies for attorneys of survivors who 
are separating from abusive partners without leaving the state. Any time an attorney 
is working with a survivor prior to or during a separation and children are involved, 
the attorney should consult her state’s parental kidnapping statute to determine 
whether her client could be at risk and whether she should counsel her client around 
potential remedial measures that the client could take to strengthen her position, 
including filing for custody or alerting authorities to her and her children’s current 
location.232 
Criminal defense attorneys may also find themselves working with fleeing 
survivors if parental kidnapping charges are filed. While jurisdictional statutes may 
be less critical to the criminal case itself, survivor-defendants may be unaware of the 
options or restrictions that these statutes impose on them and would greatly benefit 
from comprehensive counseling that addresses all their goals, needs, and questions. 
Many survivors may not interact with an attorney until they are charged or even 
arraigned with parental kidnapping. As such, a broader understanding of the systems 
impacting fleeing survivors would be extremely valuable for clients.233 Given that 
public defenders typically carry very large caseloads that include a large variety of 
charges and may not include very many female clients, expertise in this specific area 
may well prove untenable. Developing a strong relationship with a civil legal 
services provider as both a resource and a source for narrowly tailored referrals 
would allow public defenders to serve their clients more holistically. 
Although the interrelationship between criminal charges and immigration 
consequences has appropriately received much attention,234 it is similarly important 
to clients that defense attorneys be able to articulate how guilty pleas or convictions 
may impact a client’s custody determination or parental rights.235 Although a guilty 
plea to a misdemeanor with a sentence of time served or probation may be appealing, 
                                         
231 For attorneys with clients contemplating leaving the country, familiarity with the 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction is also critical. 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction art. 3, Oct. 25, 
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case than about the case itself. Liberty interests were not always paramount.”). 
 
2018] CRIMINALIZING BATTERED MOTHERS 301 
especially to a mother who has been separated from her children, even a low level 
conviction for custodial interference can result in a denial of custody or a termination 
of parental rights.236 
 
B.  Amending State Laws and Policies 
 
In addition to advocating for more effective client representation on an 
individual level, fleeing survivors would benefit greatly from thoughtful reform of 
parental kidnapping statutes. It is important to remember, however, that 
improvements to individual statutes are made against the backdrop of our flawed 
criminal justice system. As law professor Aya Gruber powerfully articulated in the 
related context of reforming mandatory domestic violence criminal polices,  
 
I see problems with any kind of criminal enforcement in the absence of 
widespread social changes. Even “progressive” criminal reforms rest on 
the assumption that proper education of state actors will enable the 
criminal system to empower rather than subordinate minorities. I am 
skeptical of this possibility and hold the suspicious belief that, however 
well-intentioned, most criminal law reforms end up becoming yet another 
procedural vehicle for warehousing the worst off.237 
 
It nonetheless does seem worthwhile to consider what kinds of short term 
changes might prevent survivors from falling too easily within the ambit of parental 
kidnapping laws. There are three reforms which could greatly improve outcomes for 
survivors, two of which are directly related to amending the statutes themselves; the 
third is a more broadly applicable systemic change. 
First, domestic violence advocates and activists should support and lobby for 
the adoption of accessible exemptions to parental kidnapping statutes in every 
state.238 Every state’s statute should provide an exemption for survivors fleeing 
either child abuse or domestic violence so that survivors can avoid criminal charges. 
These exemptions should be straightforward and should not impose onerous 
requirements to invoke their protection. Such an exemption might read: “No one 
with a right to custody commits this offense if their actions were taken based on a 
good faith belief that a failure to act would endanger their or the child’s safety or 
welfare.” 
Another benefit to adopting exemptions such as this would be that the burden 
of proof would fall on the prosecutor and not the defendant at trial. Rather than the 
defendant having to meet the burden of proving that she was fleeing from violence, 
the prosecutor would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was not, to 
make out all the elements of the crime. 
                                         
236 See Klein et al., supra note 15, at 124–25; Raeder, supra note 37, at 122–23. 
237 Gruber, supra note 32, at 822–23. 
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Second, state legislatures should amend their parental kidnapping statutes to 
require malicious intent to deprive the coparent of access to the child. Survivors 
fleeing from abuse would not typically meet this requirement. This amendment 
would benefit survivors without explicitly referencing domestic violence or 
appearing political. Both statutory changes would also benefit immigrant survivors 
in ways that adding an affirmative defense would not. If an immigrant survivor 
prevailed at trial by successfully invoking an affirmative defense, she might still be 
risking deportation if the prosecutor proved all the elements of the offense. These 
amendments would modify the elements of the offense itself, thus making it less 
likely that a survivor might be acquitted yet also placed into removal proceedings. 
Finally, and more broadly, states should expand their use of alternatives to 
incarceration for survivors convicted of parental kidnapping.239 The argument for 
implementing viable alternatives to incarceration in the parental kidnapping context 
is compelling because it would reduce the state’s infliction of trauma on survivors 
and children who have experienced violence directly, indirectly, or both. Some 
alternatives to incarceration that would keep nonabusive parents with their children 
include home confinement and electronic monitoring, community service, fines, and 
mandated mental health or drug treatment.240 While each of these options could pose 
serious challenges to homeless, low income, or working survivors, they should 
nonetheless be considered and employed when possible. 
The use of alternatives to incarceration will benefit survivors whose 
incarceration may put them at risk of having their relationships with their children 
severed or their parental rights terminated.241 It would also benefit their children by 
granting them the stability of remaining with their nonabusive parent instead of 
having to stay with any combination of the abusive parent, relatives, friends, or 
foster parents.242 Scholars have also argued that children are more adversely affected 
when their mother is incarcerated than when their father is243 due in part to the loss 
of their primary caretaker.244 Moreover, the effects of parental incarceration are 
                                         
239 See FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, ALTERNATIVES TO 
INCARCERATION IN A NUTSHELL, http://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/FS-
Alternatives-in-a-Nutshell-7.8.pdf [https://perma.cc/NFD2-ZBK4]. 
240 See id.  
241 See Charles J. Hynes, Prosecutor Seeks Alternatives to Incarceration, 16 CRIM. 
JUST. 48, 50 (2001); see also Kennedy, supra note 208, at 165–66.  
242 Kennedy, supra note 208, at 171 (discussing the “serious childcare gap” that is 
generated by the detention or incarceration of mothers, who are typically children’s primary 
caretakers); see also TRAVIS, supra note 210, at 132 (discussing the impact of mothers’ 
incarceration on children).  
243 See Raeder, supra note 37, at 106; Kennedy, supra note 208, at 186 (noting that 
“[c]hildren of incarcerated mothers may be at greater risk of troubled behavior than the 
children of incarcerated fathers, putting these children at greater risk for engaging in criminal 
behavior and continuing a legacy of involvement with the criminal justice system.”).  
244 See Julie Ajinkya, Rethinking How to Address the Growing Female Prison 
Population, CTR. AM. PROG. (Mar. 8, 2013, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/ 
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extensive and can severely impact children’s health, development, and behavior in 
both the short and long term.245 Imposing alternatives to incarceration can promote 
both individual and familial health and stability while also decreasing the costs of 
incarceration, foster care placement, and the collateral consequences of both on 
survivors, their children, and their communities.  
 
C.  Recommendations for the Domestic Violence Movement 
 
Finally, domestic violence advocates, activists, and scholars should also push 
for the mainstream domestic violence movement246 to embrace an intersectional 
understanding of the role the state plays in the lives of survivors and their families—
including their abusive partners’ lives.247 First, the movement should encourage an 
                                         
issues/women/news/2013/03/08/55787/rethinking-how-to-address-the-growing-female-
prison-population/ [https://perma.cc/XF8X-UEHK].  
245 TRAVIS, supra note 210, at 138–42; see also Chieko M. Clarke, Maternal Justice 
Restored: Redressing the Ramifications of Mandatory Sentencing Minimums on Women and 
Their Children, 50 HOWARD L.J. 263, 273 (2006).  
246 It is challenging to define the domestic violence movement as it exists today. The 
movement grew out of survivors turned activists who provided services to other survivors; 
today, however, the movement is far less grassroots and can be thought of as including 
volunteers, advocates, activists, and scholars as well as policymakers, politicians, funding 
providers, and various offices and agencies within law enforcement. For more information 
on the transformation of the movement from a grassroots coalition to a professional industry, 
see Cross, supra note 217, at 87–102. Because the contemporary domestic violence 
movement is nebulous in terms of membership, leadership, and cohesive values, the author 
does not use the term to refer to an entity or explicit coalition but rather to collectively 
describe individuals engaged in domestic violence and sexual assault advocacy and reform.  
247 The National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women and the Battered 
Women’s Justice Project, two national technical assistance organizations, have long been 
promoting this broader lens. These organizations produce extensive trainings, webinars, and 
written resources that discuss various ways domestic violence and the state intersect. See, 
e.g., Donna Coker & Ahjané D. Macquoid, Why Opposing Hyper-Incarceration Should Be 
Central to the Work of the Anti-Domestic Violence Movement, 5 UNIV. MIAMI RACE SOCIAL 
J. L. REV. 585, 617–18 (2015); Courtney Cross, Victimized Again: How the Reentry Process 
Perpetuates Violence Against Survivors of Domestic Violence, NAT. CLEARINGHOUSE DEF. 
BATTERED WOMEN, 13–21 (2013), http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/e520fb_2fd88a5991be4f3 
b8511915237d31585.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6JF-ZTB5]; Sarah Murphy, Police Body 
Cameras in Domestic and Sexual Assault Investigations: Considerations and Unanswered 
Questions, BATTERED WOMEN’S JUST. PROJECT 406 (2015), http://www.bwjp.org/assets/ 
documents/pdfs/police-body-cams-in-domestic-and-sexual-assault-inve.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/ZCV9-MYNC]; Leigh Goodmark et al., Police-Involved Domestic Violence, BATTERED 
WOMEN’S JUST. PROJECT (2016), http://www.bwjp.org/resource-center/resource-
results/police-involved-dv.html [https://perma.cc/PMF6-F6GX]; Sherry Hamby, Best 
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expansive view of the legal system over the current landscape of silohed 
specialization and narrow expertise. The movement should advocate for more and 
better trainings on how different aspects of the law interact, in addition to making 
these trainings available to a broad array of attorneys, judges, law enforcement, and 
nonlegal actors who may encounter survivors with potential or actual legal 
involvement. 
The movement should also advocate for resources and services with the 
potential to prevent the precipitating events that lead survivors to flee. Because many 
survivors flee after a custody order is in place,248 the movement should also consider 
how to help survivors and their children obtain and abide by appropriate custody 
orders. Because court appointed guardians ad litem and family investigators play 
such a large role in providing information and making recommendations to the court, 
the movement should place a heavy emphasis on training these individuals—
especially given widespread complaints regarding some third parties’ propensity to 
recommend unsafe forms of custody to abusive litigants.249 Another suggestion for 
the movement is to support free or low cost supervised visitation centers where 
parents could visit with their children yet could not abuse or kidnap them.250 The 
availability of these centers would help mitigate survivors’ real fears regarding 
treatment of themselves and their children, which could ameliorate some survivors’ 
desire to flee. This support is especially critical given recent trends that have seen 
many of these centers close or decrease hours and staff due to cuts in funding.251 
Additionally, the movement should adopt a larger framework of 
antioppression—opposing and subverting not only those systems that subordinate 
survivors of violence but also those that oppress marginalized individuals and 
communities more broadly.252 Such a shift would require a reexamination of laws 
and policies that dictate how survivors respond to domestic violence as well as 
recognition that making financial resources and social services available to survivors 
                                         
248 JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 4.  
249 See generally DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LEGAL EMPOWERMENT AND APPEALS PROJECT, 
THE PROBLEMATIC ROLE OF GUARDIANS AD LITEM IN CUSTODY AND ABUSE CASES 6–31 
(2011) (providing anecdotal evidence of 28 incidents in which survivors felt guardians ad 
litem were complicit in their revictimization).  
250 See generally CAMPBELL ET AL., FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, BEYOND 
OBSERVATION: CONSIDERATIONS FOR ADVANCING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PRACTICE IN 
SUPERVISED VISITATION 7–11 (2008) (providing an overview of the history, mission, and 
goals of utilizing supervised visitation centers in domestic violence contexts).  
251 See, e.g., Elizabeth Sias, Local Host Site for Supervised Parental Visitation Closes, 
ISANTI COUNTY NEWS (Oct. 19, 2011, 11:55 PM), http://isanticountynews.com/2011/10/19/ 
local-host-site-for-supervised-parental-visitation-closes/ [https://perma.cc/A4U9-S2QG] 
(discussing how, due to funding cuts, the nearest supervised visitation center was an over an 
hour away from the former site); CFS Opens New Supervised Visitation Center in Upper 
Valley, EAGLE TIMES A3 (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.eagletimes.com/pageview/viewer/ 
2016-08-03#page=2 [https://perma.cc/L2PA-G87P] (noting void left by closure of a 
previous center).  
252 See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 32, at 830. 
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and their communities may prove more transformative than any legal intervention.253 
For survivors with children in violent relationships, this shift in focus would 
translate into increased agency in deciding how to respond to the abuse, expanded 
preventative and remedial services with minimal risk of undesired state intervention, 
and the option of engaging with a legal system that is no longer premised on outdated 
stereotypes of good mothers and worthy victims. For survivors who choose not to 
leave their abusive partners, it may also consist of providing services and resources 
to both individuals in the relationship to promote stability and safety.254 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Parents experiencing domestic violence are caught in a double bind: civil and 
criminal court systems place immense pressure on survivors to leave abusive 
relationships, yet leaving in a manner that is not state sanctioned may jeopardize 
their safety, liberty, and relationships with their children. Survivors who do not 
comply with this pressure to separate may lose custody or even parental rights, 
potentially resulting in their children residing with the abusive parent or entering the 
foster care system. Choosing to leave the relationship, however, may usher in a host 
of logistical and legal challenges as well, which also include loss of custody or 
parental rights as well as incurring criminal charges. 
Remedies for this catch 22 must include—but not be limited to—suggestions 
for statutory amendments. In addition to legislative action, change must be made 
more broadly. Civil and criminal attorneys representing survivors in related matters 
must be able to recognize the signs and impact of domestic violence and argue their 
relevance in court. Police, prosecutors, and judges must also develop a more nuanced 
understanding of domestic violence dynamics and how their own involvement and 
interventions may intersect and interact with the abuse. Finally, the domestic 
violence movement must not only remain committed to the trainings and 
consciousness raising necessary to impart this awareness to legal actors. It must also 
advocate for conditions that would prevent the need to flee with children, ranging 
from repealing policies that undermine survivors’ agency to funding supportive 
services for both survivors and abusive partners. Such wide ranging advocacy would 
necessitate coalition building outside of the victims’ rights movement and would 
illuminate often overlooked commonalities between the domestic violence 
movement and the criminal justice reform movement. 
                                         
253 See FERRARO, supra note 61, at 12–13; Dorothy Roberts, Feminism, Race, and 
Adoption Policy, in THE COLOR OF VIOLENCE: THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY 42, 50 (INCITE! 
Women of Color Against Violence ed. 2016); Kathleen J. Ferraro, The Dance of 
Dependency: A Genealogy of Domestic Violence Discourse, 11 HYPATIA 77, 84 (1996). 
254 When survivors believe their abuse is caused or exacerbated by their partners’ 
struggles with employment, housing, physical or mental health, or substance abuse (to name 
only a few external factors), the movement should think of remedies beyond Batterers 
Intervention Programs when considering how to support survivors who are unable or 
unwilling to leave their relationship. See, e.g., Weissman, supra note 20, at 229 (discussing 
a lack of attention paid to how economic realities may be a catalyst for abuse). 
